美國的電信商提供 API,讓第三方透過 IP 就可以知道你的真實身份

前陣子的報料,美國的電信商提供 API 給第三方,讓第三方可以用 IP address 查出你的真實身份:「Want to see something crazy? Open this link on your phone with WiFi turned off.」,像是這樣:

These services are using your mobile phone’s IP address to look up your phone number, your billing information and possibly your phone’s current location as provided by cell phone towers (no GPS or phone location services required).

目前所有的網站都已經被下架了,但可以從當時的截圖看到有多少資訊。AT&T 的新聞稿在「AT&T Helps Businesses Improve Mobile Transaction Security with New Mobile Identity API Toolkit」,新聞稿沒被下掉我猜可能是因為上市公司受法令限制的關係?

這其實是一個警示,說明了美國的電信商開始把大家一直認為極為隱私的資料賣給第三方:

But what these services show us is even more alarming: US telcos appear to be selling direct, non-anonymized, real-time access to consumer telephone data to third party services — not just federal law enforcement officials — who are then selling access to that data.

而且作者在 GitHub 上看到有程式碼針對韓國電信商提供的 API 呼叫,所以韓國也有類似服務:

I found what looks like a third-party API implementation for a Korean Danal API on GitHub. The author wrote the code for South Korean telcos, so there may be differences with US carriers. The query parameters in the HTTP requests are similar to what I remember seeing in the Danal demo. It’s unclear from my reading of the code whether or not this API requires operation inside of e.g. a Danal Inc. hosted-iframe for identity confirmation. The diagram on page 4 of this documentation describing the Korean “Danal Pay” service appears to show the client interacting with the customer’s servers only.

台灣呢,嘿嘿...

伊朗透過 BGP 管制網路的手段影響其他國家網路...

Dyn (之前被 DDoS 打爆,過一陣子被 Oracle 買去的那個 Dyn) 的這篇「Iran Leaks Censorship via BGP Hijacks」講到他們偵測到伊朗透過 BGP hijack 管制網站的問題。

前陣子伊朗透過 private ASN 放了 99.192.226.0/24 出來,影響到其他國家:

Last week, Iranian state telecom announced a BGP hijack of address space (99.192.226.0/24) hosting numerous pornographic websites.

由於這段 IP address 在 internet 上是以 99.192.128.0/17 在放,就因為 /24 優先權比較高而被蓋過去影響到全世界...

然後過了幾天,開始攻擊蘋果的 iTunes 服務,不過這次是以 /32 放出來。由於大多數收的最小單位是 /24,這次的影響沒有上次大:

In addition, TIC announced BGP hijacks for 20 individual IPs associated with Apple’s iTunes service. These too were carried by Omantel to the outside world, albeit with a smaller footprint due to the fact that BGP routes for /32’s typically don’t propagate very far.

這看得出來 routing 在 internet 上還是非常脆弱...

CloudFlare 對 HiNet 成本的抱怨 (還有其他 ISP...)

CloudFlare 特地寫了一篇討拍文在分析對六個 ISP 的超高成本:「Bandwidth Costs Around the World」。

其他的就不講了,先看對價錢的定義:

As a benchmark, let's assume the cost of transit in Europe and North America is 10 units (per Mbps).

然後來看亞洲區以及 HiNet 的部份寫了什麼:

Two Asian locations stand out as being especially expensive: Seoul and Taipei. In these markets, with powerful incumbents (Korea Telecom and HiNet), transit costs 15x as much as in Europe or North America, or 150 units.

成本大約是 15 倍。另外說明這六個 ISP 佔了他們 50% 的頻寬成本 (以及 6% 的流量):

Today, however, there are six expensive networks (HiNet, Korea Telecom, Optus, Telecom Argentina, Telefonica, Telstra) that are more than an order of magnitude more expensive than other bandwidth providers around the globe and refuse to discuss local peering relationships. To give you a sense, these six networks represent less than 6% of the traffic but nearly 50% of our bandwidth costs.

為什麼有種濃濃的既視感 XDDD