紐約時報的 The Privacy Project 分析了這二十年來 Google 的隱私條款

紐約時報The Privacy Project 分析了 Google 在這二十年來的 Privacy Policy (英文版),可以看出網路廣告產業的變化,以及為什麼變得極力蒐集個資與使用者行為:「Google’s 4,000-Word Privacy Policy Is a Secret History of the Internet」。整篇看起來有點長,可以先看裡面的小標題,然後看一下列出來的條文差異,把不同時間的重點都列出來了。

最早期的轉變是「針對性」:

1999-2004
No longer talks about users ‘in aggregate’

1999 年的版本強調了整體性,後來因為針對性廣告而被拿掉:

1999
Google may share information about users with advertisers, business partners, sponsors, and other third parties. However, we only talk about our users in aggregate, not as individuals. For example, we may disclose how frequently the average Google user visits Google, or which other query words are most often used with the query word "Microsoft."

接下來的是蒐集的項目大幅增加,讓分析更準確:

2005-2011
Google shares more data for better targeting

然後是更多產品線互相使用使用者行為資訊:

2012-2017
Its complicated business requires a more complicated policy

接下來是因為法規而配合修改條文 (最有名的就是 GDPR):

2018-PRESENT
Policy adjusts to meet stricter regulation

iOS 13 與 macOS 10.15 對憑證的限制

Slack 上看到同事丟出來的,關於之後要推出的 iOS 13 與 macOS 10.15 會對憑證限制的項目:「Requirements for trusted certificates in iOS 13 and macOS 10.15」。

主要是把不安全的演算法淘汰掉 (RSA 小於 2048 bits,以及 SHA-1 類的 hash algorithm),這兩個部份相關的新聞應該不少,沒有什麼太大問題:

TLS server certificates and issuing CAs using RSA keys must use key sizes greater than or equal to 2048 bits. Certificates using RSA key sizes smaller than 2048 bits are no longer trusted for TLS.

TLS server certificates and issuing CAs must use a hash algorithm from the SHA-2 family in the signature algorithm. SHA-1 signed certificates are no longer trusted for TLS.

然後是要求憑證使用 SAN (Subject Alternative Name),舊的標準 CN (CommonName) 將不會再被信任。

如果是公開簽發的憑證應該都沒問題 (像是 Let's Encrypt,或是花錢買的那些),主要的問題應該會出現在自己建立的憑證,網路上蠻多舊資料還是產生 CN...

TLS server certificates must present the DNS name of the server in the Subject Alternative Name extension of the certificate. DNS names in the CommonName of a certificate are no longer trusted.

另外是 2019/7/1 之後發出的憑證,有額外兩個規範要注意,第一個是強制要透過 EKU 指定 id-kp-serverAuth,這是出自 RFC 5280

   id-kp-serverAuth             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 }
   -- TLS WWW server authentication
   -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature,
   -- keyEncipherment or keyAgreement

TLS server certificates must contain an ExtendedKeyUsage (EKU) extension containing the id-kp-serverAuth OID.

再來是時間的限制,接下來的憑證最長只認得 825 天 (大約 27 個月多一些),以前都惡搞 -days 3650,現在得兩年簽一次了:

TLS server certificates must have a validity period of 825 days or fewer (as expressed in the NotBefore and NotAfter fields of the certificate).

整體看起來主要是影響自己簽的部份...

荷蘭認為 Cookie Wall 不符合對 GDPR 的規範

Update:弄錯國家了,是荷蘭...

Cookie Wall 指的是不同意接受 cookie policy 就無法使用網站的限制,像是這樣的東西:

在「Cookie walls don’t comply with GDPR, says Dutch DPA」這邊看到荷蘭認為 Cookie Wall 不符合 GDPR 的規範:

Cookie walls that demand a website visitor agrees to their internet browsing being tracked for ad-targeting as the “price” of entry to the site are not compliant with European data protection law, the Dutch data protection agency clarified yesterday.

後面應該會有訴訟,重點會在這...

2017 年 CA/Browser Forum 在台北辦的見面會議的會議記錄出爐了...

2017 年 CA/Browser Forum 在台北舉辦的見面會議,會議記錄總算是出爐了:「2017-10-04 Minutes of Face-to-Face Meeting 42 in Taipei - CAB Forum」。

由於是辦在台北,所以台灣很多單位都有出席,像是中央警察大學 (1)、中華電信 (11)、日盛聯合會計師事務所 (1)、TWCA (3):

Attendance: Peter Bowen (Amazon); Geoff Keating and Curt Spann (Apple); Jeremy Shen (Central Police University); Franck Leroy (Certinomis / Docapost); Wayne Chan and Sing-man Ho (Certizen Limited); Wen-Cheng Wang, Bon-Yeh Lin, Wen-Chun Yang, Jenhao Ou, Wei-Hao Tung, Chiu-Yun Chuang, Chung-Chin Hsiao, Chin-Fu Huang, Li-Chun Chen, Pin-Jung Chiang, and Wen-Hui Tsai (Chunghwa Telecom); Alex Wight and JP Hamilton (Cisco), Robin Alden (Comodo), Gord Beal (CPA Canada), Ben Wilson and Jeremy Rowley (DigiCert), Arno Fiedler and Enrico Entschew (D-TRUST); Kirk Hall (Entrust Datacard); Ou Jingan, Zhang Yongqiang, and Xiu Lei (GDCA); Atsushi Inaba and Giichi Ishii (GlobalSign); Wayne Thayer (GoDaddy); Devon O’Brien (Google); David Hsiu (KPMG); Mike Reilly (Microsoft); Gervase Markham and Aaron Wu (Mozilla); Hoang Trung La (National Electronic Authentication Center (NEAC) of Vietnam); Tadahiko Ito (Secom Trust Systems); Leo Grove and Fotis Loukos (SSL.com); Brian Hsiung (Sunrise CPA Firm); Steve Medin (Symantec); Frank Corday and Tim Hollebeek (Trustwave); Robin Lin, David Chen, and Huang Fu Yen (TWCA); and Don Sheehy and Jeff Ward (WebTrust).

開頭有提到會議記錄 delay 的情況:

Preliminary Note: The CA/Browser Forum was delayed in completing the minutes for its last Face-to-Face meeting Oct. 4-5, 2017 in Taipei, and the proposed final Minutes were only sent by the Chair to the Members on December 13, 2017 for their review. There was not enough time for Members to review the draft before the next teleconference of December 14, and the teleconference of December 28 was cancelled due to the holidays. The next Forum teleconference is scheduled for January 11, 2018.

會議記錄很長,主要是有不少主題被拿到見面會議上討論,另外有一半的篇幅是在說明各家 root program policy 的變化。

下次的見面會議會在三月,然後會由 Amazon 辦在東岸:

Peter confirmed the next F2F meeting will be hosted by Amazon on March 6-8, 2018 at its Herndon, Virginia location. More information will be provided in the coming months.

AWS PrivateLink

AWS 計畫把先前設計的 VPC Endpoint 都併到 AWS PrivateLink 裡,統一管理:「New – AWS PrivateLink for AWS Services: Kinesis, Service Catalog, EC2 Systems Manager, Amazon EC2 APIs, and ELB APIs in your VPC」。

Today we are announcing AWS PrivateLink, the newest generation of VPC Endpoints which is designed for customers to access AWS services in a highly available and scalable manner, while keeping all the traffic within the AWS network. Kinesis, Service Catalog, Amazon EC2, EC2 Systems Manager (SSM), and Elastic Load Balancing (ELB) APIs are now available to use inside your VPC, with support for more services coming soon such as Key Management Service (KMS) and Amazon Cloudwatch.

這樣就不用弄 proxy server 然後在上面管一堆 policy 了... (先不講自己搞 HA 的麻煩事,光是有些程式還得 patch 才能支援 proxy 就會想翻桌了 XD)

security.txt

最近開始有人在討論「security.txt」這個標準了,可以在「A Method for Web Security Policies」這邊看到 draft。

想法其實類似於 robots.txt

# Our security address
Contact: security@example.com

# Our PGP key
Encryption: https://example.com/pgp-key.txt

# Our disclosure policy
Disclosure: Full

以往的方式是透過 WHOIS 或是 DNS 的 SOA 欄位來聯絡,或是直接寄到 security@domain,現在這個架構就多了一套方法,是好是壞不曉得...

利用上傳的檔案跳過 CSP 限制

CSP 可以做到一些簡單的保護機制,但在設計不良的情況下還是有辦法繞過。

這次是上傳合法的 JPEG 檔案,但當作 javascript 檔案繞過去:「Bypassing CSP using polyglot JPEGs」。

開頭的「FF D8 FF E0」可以在「List of file signatures」這邊看到是「JPEG raw or in the JFIF or Exif file format」,而這四個字元在 javascript 不會出問題。接下來的「2F 2A」表示 JPEG header 長度,剛好就是「/*」,把後面的東西給包起來,後面再用類似的方式一直組合就打穿了...

這種攻擊要跳過的是「用 CSP 的 self 限制不能引用外部網站 javascript」的限制,但還是有些前提:

  • 允許使用者傳到同一個 domain 上面。
  • 網站上有 XSS 漏洞。

其中第一個問題常見的解法是另外開一個 domain 來放使用者上傳的檔案 (最好是連 top domain 都不一樣,完全隔開),才可以透過 CSP 降低風險...

Mozilla 也在考慮對 Certificate Transparency 的掌握度

由於 Firefox 要支援 Certificate Transparency 的緣故,在「Mozilla CT Policy」這邊 Mozilla 在討論要建立自己的 CT policy 以及自己的架構:

CT is coming to Firefox. As part of that, Mozilla needs to have a set of CT policies surrounding how that will work. Like our root inclusion program, we intend to run our CT log inclusion program in an open and transparent fashion, such that the Internet community can see how it works and how decisions are made.

這樣就有個開頭了...

Mozilla 對 WoSign + StartCom 的正式處分

MozillaWoSign + StartCom 的不信任處分出爐了:「Distrusting New WoSign and StartCom Certificates」,最後處分的內容跟之前的討論差不多 (參考先前寫的「Mozilla 對於 WoSign + StartCom 根憑證的新發展:拔除」)。

Mozilla 台灣有放出中文版的說明 (差不多就是英文翻譯的版本):「取消對 WoSign 與 StartCom 新簽發憑證的信任」。

這次比較麻煩的地方在於要信任已經發出的 certificate,而且量太大無法窮舉。所以必須改增加程式碼處理,而這個方法無法對使用 Mozilla CA Certificate Store 的人生效 (因為這包套件只是一堆 pem 檔案,沒辦法放特殊的邏輯進去...)

另外現在 Firefox 是 49 版,要到 51 版才會生效,看起來還會花一陣子...