WPA2 安全漏洞

話說 WPA2 也撐了十三年了:

WPA2 became available in 2004 and is a common shorthand for the full IEEE 802.11i (or IEEE 802.11i-2004) standard.

這次的漏洞可以參考「Severe flaw in WPA2 protocol leaves Wi-Fi traffic open to eavesdropping」這邊。

PoC 稱作 KRACK (Key Reinstallation Attacks),漏洞將會在十一月正式發表,從會議的標題名稱大概可以知道方向,是對 Nonce 下手:「Key Reinstallation Attacks: Forcing Nonce Reuse in WPA2」。另外站台 www.krackattacks.com 已經放好,等後續的發表更新了。

對於無線網路的各種漏洞,老方法還是目前最有效的方法,也是這次的 workaround 之一:上強度足夠的 VPN。

Update:補上論文「Key Reinstallation Attacks: Forcing Nonce Reuse in WPA2」。


在「AES-GCM-SIV: Specification and Analysis」這邊看到 AES-GCM-SIV 的作者自己投稿上去的資料,是個已經被放進 BoringSSL 並且在 QUIC 上使用的演算法:

We remark that AES-GCM-SIV is already integrated into Google's BoringSSL library \cite{BoringSSL}, and its deployment for ticket encryption in QUIC \cite{QUIC} is underway.

在 RFC 上的說明解釋了這個演算法的目的是希望當 nonce 沒有被正確實作時仍然可以有比 AES-GCM 強的保護:

This memo specifies two authenticated encryption algorithms that are nonce misuse-resistant - that is that they do not fail catastrophically if a nonce is repeated.

在 128 bits 的情況下,加密的速度大約是 AES-GCM 的 2/3 (在都有硬體加速的情況下),但解密的速度則與 AES-GCM 相當:

For encryption, it is slower than AES-GCM, because achieving nonce-misuse resistance requires, by definition, two (serialized) passes over the data. Nevertheless, optimized implementations run GCM-SIV (for 128-bit keys) at less than one cycle per byte on modern processors (roughly 2/3 of the speed of nonce-respecting AES-GCM). On the other hand, GCM-SIV decryption runs at almost the same speed as AES-GCM.

不過這就是 trade-off 了,如果 nonce 有正確被實作的話,其實不需要這個...