公司在菲律賓的辦公室因為常常會需要連到 AWS 傳輸影音資料 (新加坡，ap-southeast-1)，但發現偶而會很不順，傳輸的時候會很卡，所以後來決定租了一條專線用 AWS Direct Connect 接進去。
不過因為跑在 AWS 上面的服務是掛在 public network 上，而不是 private ip 的網段，所以就不能用 IPsec site-to-site 打通收工，而需要搞 BGP routing，然後就卡關卡的亂七八糟 XD
首先是文書作業的部份，因為 AWS 對於 public network peering 需要證明你要交換的 IP address 是你自己的 (或是有被授權)，這部份在 web console 上建立完 Public VIF 後會進入審核階段，接下來就要開 support ticket 提供 LOA-CFA 文件後才能繼續設定，我們這邊是從 ISP 申請 AWS Direct Connect 線路時拿到這份 PDF 文件。
Doing md5 for 3s on 16 size blocks: 5465798 md5's in 3.00s
Doing md5 for 3s on 64 size blocks: 3761125 md5's in 3.00s
Doing md5 for 3s on 256 size blocks: 1835218 md5's in 2.99s
Doing md5 for 3s on 1024 size blocks: 582162 md5's in 2.96s
Doing md5 for 3s on 8192 size blocks: 102995 md5's in 2.97s
Doing md5 for 3s on 16384 size blocks: 47177 md5's in 2.99s
Linode：
Doing md5 for 3s on 16 size blocks: 11510700 md5's in 3.00s
Doing md5 for 3s on 64 size blocks: 8361353 md5's in 2.99s
Doing md5 for 3s on 256 size blocks: 3751929 md5's in 3.00s
Doing md5 for 3s on 1024 size blocks: 1169457 md5's in 3.00s
Doing md5 for 3s on 8192 size blocks: 157678 md5's in 2.99s
Doing md5 for 3s on 16384 size blocks: 78874 md5's in 3.00s
Vultr (這是 USD$2.5/month 的方案)：
Doing md5 for 3s on 16 size blocks: 14929209 md5's in 2.97s
Doing md5 for 3s on 64 size blocks: 9479563 md5's in 2.97s
Doing md5 for 3s on 256 size blocks: 4237907 md5's in 2.98s
Doing md5 for 3s on 1024 size blocks: 1320548 md5's in 2.98s
Doing md5 for 3s on 8192 size blocks: 161940 md5's in 2.96s
Doing md5 for 3s on 16384 size blocks: 86592 md5's in 2.98s
然後補一個 AWS 的 t2.nano (在還有 CPU credit 可以全速跑的情況下)，不過這不公平，參考用而已：
Doing md5 for 3s on 16 size blocks: 19257426 md5's in 3.00s
Doing md5 for 3s on 64 size blocks: 11168752 md5's in 2.99s
Doing md5 for 3s on 256 size blocks: 4959879 md5's in 3.00s
Doing md5 for 3s on 1024 size blocks: 1518690 md5's in 3.00s
Doing md5 for 3s on 8192 size blocks: 203910 md5's in 3.00s
Doing md5 for 3s on 16384 size blocks: 102321 md5's in 2.99s
Subsequent to Yahoo's acquisition by Verizon, and during integration, the company recently obtained new intelligence and now believes, following an investigation with the assistance of outside forensic experts, that all Yahoo user accounts were affected by the August 2013 theft.
Yahoo today announced that the huge data breach in August 2013 affected every user on its service — that’s all three billion user accounts and up from the initial one billion figure Yahoo initially reported.
2013 這包用的是 MD5 hash，以現在的運算能力來看，可以當作沒有 hash...：
The stolen user account information may have included names, email addresses, telephone numbers, dates of birth, hashed passwords (using MD5) and, in some cases, encrypted or unencrypted security questions and answers.
Now the fields are filtered but this is a reasonably recent change. Prior to July 2015 the hashed passwords were shown to anyone who whois’d the maintainer object and used md5 passwords. Which was nearly all of them in my experience.
Mntner: DTAG-NIC
Descr: Deutsche Telekom Internet Services NIC
Admin-c: KK281-RIPE
Tech-c: HI56-RIPE
Auth: MD5-PW $1$KQ3NSRfS$/bcvLAz2BKyf5HF4VkPMh/
Mnt-by: DTAG-NIC
Referral-by: RIPE-DBM-MNT
