這次 LastPass 出包搞的蠻大的，在官方的「Notice of Recent Security Incident」的裡面有提到這次的資料外洩包括了使用的 encrypted vault data 也被洩漏了：
The threat actor was also able to copy a backup of customer vault data from the encrypted storage container which is stored in a proprietary binary format that contains both unencrypted data, such as website URLs, as well as fully-encrypted sensitive fields such as website usernames and passwords, secure notes, and form-filled data.
官方一直強調這是 encrypted data，但離職員工爆料加密強度不足的問題：「1606428769731878913.html」，其中這段在講 legacy 版本的加密問題，居然曾經用過 ECB mode：
Lots of vault entries may be encrypted with ECB mode AES-256. I worked on supporting unauthenticated CBC mode. But re-encrypting a users vault entries requires having their master key.
這個如同 Hacker News 上的討論「I worked at LastPass as an engineer (twitter.com/ejcx_)」提到的，以 1980 年代的標準就已經知道 ECB mode 的問題了：
> Lots of vault entries may be encrypted with ECB mode AES-256.
Wtf wtf wtf. This would be considered wildly insecure even by the standards of the 80s
其他提到 PBKDF2 的強度是逐步增加，從早期的 5000 到現在預設的 100100，這點倒是可以理解。
要避免依賴廠商的資安，一種方式是用目前成熟的開源 Password Manager，並且使用檔案儲存 (像是 KeePassXC 這類工具)，再搭配 file sync 的工具跨機器使用 (像是 Syncthing 這樣獨立確認每個 device 身份的方式)，但方便性不會像這些商用方案這麼好用就是了...
這次故事好像還沒結束，遇到西方的長假，反應都比較慢...
