Dropbox 也要搞自己的密碼管理器

Dropbox 也要搞自己的密碼管理器 Dropbox Passwords:「Dropbox Passwords coming soon for all users」。

看起來只要是 Dropbox 的付費方案就可以無限使用,而免費版的則是 50 組。從下載頁看起來目前在 PC 上只支援 Microsoft WindowsmacOS,不支援 Linux

Come back to this page on a PC with Windows 10 or a Mac with at least macOS Sierra 10.12 to get the Passwords desktop app.

而行動平台就是 iOSAndroid

How do I use the Android and iPhone password manager?

Once you sign in to the Passwords app, it automatically fills in your usernames and passwords so you can access frequently used apps and websites on your mobile device.

從示意圖看起來有整合瀏覽器,而加密技術的部份沒有講太多,只說是 zero-knowledge encryption,先觀望看看...

WebP 的檔案大小未必比 JPEG 小...

在「Is WebP really better than JPEG?」這邊發現在差不多的條件需求下,WebP 壓出來的檔案大小未必會比 JPEG 小。

先講結論:提供服務的人可以先確認自家的 JPEG 壓縮是不是有先用 MozJPEG (壓縮率更好),然後再考慮要不要支援 WebP。

Google 在推 WebP 這個格式的時候,宣稱失真壓縮的部份可以比 JPEG 小 25%~34%:(出自「A new image format for the Web」)

WebP lossless images are 26% smaller in size compared to PNGs. WebP lossy images are 25-34% smaller than comparable JPEG images at equivalent SSIM quality index.

但作者發現 Google 之所以可以達到 25%~34% 這個數字,是因為比較的對象是 Independent JPEG Group 所釋出的 cjpeg,而如果拿 MozJPEG 相比的話應該得不到這個結果,另外也把 AV1 的 AVIF 拉進來一起測試了:

I think Google’s result of 25-34% smaller files is mostly caused by the fact that they compared their WebP encoder to the JPEG reference implementation, Independent JPEG Group’s cjpeg, not Mozilla’s improved MozJPEG encoder. I decided to run some tests to see how cjpeg, MozJPEG and WebP compare. I also tested the new AVIF format, based on the open AV1 video codec. AVIF support is already in Firefox behind a flag and should be coming soon to Chrome if this ticket is to be believed.

這邊作者測試用的圖集是 Kodak Lossless True Color Image Suite,測試的結果發現 WebP 的確比 libjpeg (cjpeg) 好一些,但沒有像 Google 講的那麼多 (這邊就不知道是不是現在的 libjpeg 又有改善),而 WebP 與 MozJPEG 相比的話就沒有明顯優勢了:

WebP seems to have about 10% better compression compared to libjpeg in most cases, except with 1500px images where the compression is about equal.

However, when compared to MozJPEG, WebP only performs better with small 500px images. With other image sizes the compression is equal or worse.

I think MozJPEG is the clear winner here with consistently about 10% better compression than libjpeg.

另外也提到了 AVIF 的壓縮率很好,不過要注意演算法會把非重點部位的細節吃掉:

I think AVIF is a really exciting development and compared to WebP it seems like a true next-generation codec with about 30% better compression ratio compared to libjpeg. Only concern I have is the excessive blurring of low detail areas. It remains to be seen if this can be improved when more advanced tooling becomes available.

對網頁的應用來說,WebP 另外一個痛點是在 Safari 上的支援度,在 caniuse.com 的「WebP image format」這邊可以看到目前各瀏覽器都支援了,就剩下 Safari 還不支援,所以目前在 iOS 上得降回 JPEG:

不過這點之後也改變了,在 iOS 14 beta 裡的 Safari 可以看到支援 WebP 了:「Safari 14 Beta Release Notes」。

Media
New Features
Added WebP image support.

所以這個狀況變得有點微妙了...

Webkit 的「反追蹤反追蹤」功能...

第一次看到標題的時候的確是 WTF 的感覺,愈來愈感覺到大戰的開始:「Preventing Tracking Prevention Tracking」。

在蘋果的平台上有 Intelligent Tracking Prevention (ITP) 功能,但先前這個功能比較簡單,所以還是有很多地方可以被當作 browser fingerprint 的一部份分析,所以蘋果決定改善,然後在新版的軟體裡引入:

This blog post covers enhancements to Intelligent Tracking Prevention (ITP) included in Safari on iOS and iPadOS 13.3, Safari 13.0.4 on macOS Catalina, Mojave, and High Sierra.

包括了跨站台時 Referer 的省略:

ITP now downgrades all cross-site request referrer headers to just the page’s origin. Previously, this was only done for cross-site requests to classified domains.

然後後面三個改善都跟 3rd-party cookie 有關,其中預設擋掉帶 cookie 的 3rd-party requests 應該會讓一些網站掛掉:

ITP will now block all third-party requests from seeing their cookies, regardless of the classification status of the third-party domain, unless the first-party website has already received user interaction.

早期自己做自家 SSO 的奇技淫巧中,會設計出透過 ajax 打多個不同的網域自動登入,看起來應該會需要檢查了...

iOS 上的 Yubico Authenticator App 正式支援 NFC

Yubico 宣佈 iOS 版的 app (Yubico Authenticator) 正式支援 NFC 了:「Yubico Authenticator App for iOS Now Supports NFC」,先前在九月時的說明告知了 iOS 13 的 API 允許透過 NFC 讀與寫 (先前只能讀):「iOS 上的 Yubikey」。

作業系統的要求就如前面提到的需要 iOS 13+,而硬體上需要 iPhone 7 之後的機種,之後看看市場上的反應...

iOS 上的 Yubikey

在「Yubico iOS Authentication Expands to Include NFC」這邊看到 iOS 13 上對於 NFC 類的 MFA 會有的進展。

主要是因為之前的 NFC 只有讀取能力,所以 U2F/FIDO2/WebAuthn 之類的應用沒有辦法套用上去:

Previously, NFC on iOS was read-only, which meant that it couldn’t support modern authentication protocols like FIDO U2F, FIDO2/WebAuthn that require both read and write capabilities – but now that has changed.

iOS 13 後開放了 API 可以讀寫,所以有辦法支援這些協定了:

With these recent updates, iPhone users (running iOS 13+) can experience mobile NFC authentication with a YubiKey 5 NFC or Security Key NFC by Yubico on apps and browsers that have added support.

對於主力放在 Apple Ecosystem 的人,總算是等到了...

iOS 13 的 Safari 支援 W3C WebDriver

所以之後可以拿 WebDriver 的 library 直接接上去 (不過這個標準好像還沒有什麼人支援啊...):「WebDriver is Coming to Safari in iOS 13」,看起來是 Remote Automation 這個選項?

收斂的過程...

iOS 13 與 macOS 10.15 對憑證的限制

Slack 上看到同事丟出來的,關於之後要推出的 iOS 13 與 macOS 10.15 會對憑證限制的項目:「Requirements for trusted certificates in iOS 13 and macOS 10.15」。

主要是把不安全的演算法淘汰掉 (RSA 小於 2048 bits,以及 SHA-1 類的 hash algorithm),這兩個部份相關的新聞應該不少,沒有什麼太大問題:

TLS server certificates and issuing CAs using RSA keys must use key sizes greater than or equal to 2048 bits. Certificates using RSA key sizes smaller than 2048 bits are no longer trusted for TLS.

TLS server certificates and issuing CAs must use a hash algorithm from the SHA-2 family in the signature algorithm. SHA-1 signed certificates are no longer trusted for TLS.

然後是要求憑證使用 SAN (Subject Alternative Name),舊的標準 CN (CommonName) 將不會再被信任。

如果是公開簽發的憑證應該都沒問題 (像是 Let's Encrypt,或是花錢買的那些),主要的問題應該會出現在自己建立的憑證,網路上蠻多舊資料還是產生 CN...

TLS server certificates must present the DNS name of the server in the Subject Alternative Name extension of the certificate. DNS names in the CommonName of a certificate are no longer trusted.

另外是 2019/7/1 之後發出的憑證,有額外兩個規範要注意,第一個是強制要透過 EKU 指定 id-kp-serverAuth,這是出自 RFC 5280

   id-kp-serverAuth             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 }
   -- TLS WWW server authentication
   -- Key usage bits that may be consistent: digitalSignature,
   -- keyEncipherment or keyAgreement

TLS server certificates must contain an ExtendedKeyUsage (EKU) extension containing the id-kp-serverAuth OID.

再來是時間的限制,接下來的憑證最長只認得 825 天 (大約 27 個月多一些),以前都惡搞 -days 3650,現在得兩年簽一次了:

TLS server certificates must have a validity period of 825 days or fewer (as expressed in the NotBefore and NotAfter fields of the certificate).

整體看起來主要是影響自己簽的部份...

幫你的 iPhone 電話簿找到對應的頭像

前幾天看到的:「Announcing Vignette」,透過 social network 的資料,把本來電話簿裡面的 icon 更新:

透過 app store 的搜尋找不太到,我一開始用了「Vignette」搜不到,但用「Vignette Update」就可以。或者你可以透過他提供的連結直接開 app store:「Vignette – Update Contact Pics」。

這是一個 IAP 類的付費服務,搜尋是免費的,但如果要把資料更新回通訊錄,需要付 USD$4.99 (一次性),台灣帳號是付 TWD$170,應該是因為最近的稅務調整:

Vignette allows you to scan your contacts and see what it can find for free. If you wish to actually save these updates to your contact list, you must pay for a one-time in-app purchase. That purchase costs $4.99, is not a subscription, and is the only in-app purchase.

搜尋的範圍包括了 GravatarTwitterFacebookInstagram

Email is used for Gravatar
Twitter
Facebook
A custom network called Instagram

另外作者有提到這個 app 不傳資料到伺服器上,都是在自己的裝置上連到上面提到的 social network 尋找:

Privacy is paramount
All the processing is done on-device; this isn’t the sort of app where your contacts are uploaded en masse to some server, and out of your control.

所以速度不會太快,但對隱私比較好...

利用 Sensor 校正資訊產生 Device Fingerprint 的隱私攻擊

看到「Fingerprinting iPhones」這篇提出的攻擊,標題雖然是提到 iPhone,但實際上攻擊包括了 Android 的手機:

You are affected by this fingerprinting attack if you are using any iOS devices with the iOS version below 12.2, including the latest iPhone XS, iPhone XS Max, and iPhone XR. You are also likely to be affected if you are using a Pixel 2/3 device, although we hypothesise the generated fingerprint has less entropy and is unlikely to be globally unique. A SensorID can be generated by both apps and mobile websites and requires no user interaction.

目前 iPhone 升級到 12.2 之後可以緩解這個問題,Android 看起來還不清楚...

攻擊的方式是透過手機在出場前會使用外部的校正工具,找出手機內 sensor 所偵測到的值與實際值的差異,然後把這些資訊燒到韌體裡,當呼叫 API 時就可以修正給出比較正確的值。

而因為這些校正資訊幾乎每一隻手機都不一樣,而且不會因為重裝而變更 (即使 factory reset),加上還可以跨 app 與 web 追蹤,就成為這次攻擊的目標:

In the context of mobile devices, the main benefit of per-device calibration is that it allows more accurate attitude estimation.

資訊量其實相當大,透過 app 分析可以得到 67 bits entropy,透過網頁也有 42 bits entropy,而且不怎麼會變:

In general, it is difficult to create a unique fingerprint for iOS devices due to strict sandboxing and device homogeneity. However, we demonstrated that our approach can produce globally unique fingerprints for iOS devices from an installed app -- around 67 bits of entropy for the iPhone 6S. Calibration fingerprints generated by a website are less unique (~42 bits of entropy for the iPhone 6S), but they are orthogonal to existing fingerprinting techniques and together they are likely to form a globally unique fingerprint for iOS devices.

We have not observed any change in the SensorID of our test devices in the past half year. Our dataset includes devices running iOS 9/10/11/12. We have tested compass calibration, factory reset, and updating iOS (up until iOS 12.1); the SensorID always stays the same. We have also tried measuring the sensor data at different locations and under different temperatures; we confirm that these factors do not change the SensorID either.

目前提出來的解法是加入隨機值的噪音 (iOS 的作法),不過作者有建議預設應該要關閉 js 存取 sensor 的權限:

To mitigate this calibration fingerprint attack, vendors can add uniformly distributed random noise to ADC outputs before calibration is applied. Alternatively, vendors could round the sensor outputs to the nearest multiple of the nominal gain. Please refer to our paper for more details. In addition, we recommend privacy-focused mobile browsers add an option to disable the access to motion sensors via JavaScript. This could help protect Android devices and iOS devices that no longer receive updates from Apple.

不過當初這群人怎麼會注意到的...

Cloudflare 打算再推出 VPN 服務

去年在四月一日推出 1.1.1.1 服務的 Cloudflare 打算更進一步保護連線內容,提供 Wrap 服務 (就是 VPN):「Introducing Warp: Fixing Mobile Internet Performance and Security」。

不過這樣在 privacy 上的保護就變弱了,因為 Cloudflare 手上就拿到更多流量資訊可以交叉比對... 大概會申請起來放著在外面用,而不會平常就開著。

申請是透過 app 申請,Android 的在「1.1.1.1: Faster & Safer Internet」這邊,而 iOS 的在「1.1.1.1: Faster Internet」這邊。

目前申請後需看到排隊的編號,像是這樣: