Cloudflare 因為 Regular Expression 炸掉的問題

先前 Cloudflare 就有先說明七月二日的 outage 是因為 regular expression 造成的 (ReDoS),不過昨天發的文章更完整了,導致爆炸的 regular expression 都給出來了:「Details of the Cloudflare outage on July 2, 2019」。

ReDoS 不算是新的問題,但卻是不太好避免的問題,因為需要有經驗的工程師 (中過獎的工程師) 才比較容易知道哪些 regular expression 是有問題的... 另外就是有花時間研究 regular expression 演算法的工程師也比較容易避開。

也因次,ReDoS 算是這十年來大家在還的債,各家 framework 都因為這個問題改寫了不少 regular expression。

這次的重點在這串式子導致了 ReDoS:

(?:(?:\"|'|\]|\}|\\|\d|(?:nan|infinity|true|false|null|undefined|symbol|math)|\`|\-|\+)+[)]*;?((?:\s|-|~|!|{}|\|\||\+)*.*(?:.*=.*)))

通常容易中獎的地方就是無限制字元與 * & + 連發的地方,後面這塊 )*.*(?:.*=.*))) 看起來就不太妙,果然在後面的分析也有提到:

The critical part is .*(?:.*=.*).

以前應該是在 Formal language 裡學到的,在課堂裡面其實會學到不少業界常用工具的基礎理論...

GitHub 在 2/28 遭受的攻擊...

GitHub 在 2/28 遭受 DDoS 攻擊,蠻快就把事故報告丟出來了:「February 28th DDoS Incident Report」。

不過跟 GitHub 其他文章不太一樣,這篇算是 PR 稿吧,簡單來說就是花錢買 Akamai Prolexic 的過濾服務解決... Akamai 方的 PR 稿則是在「Memcached-fueled 1.3 Tbps attacks - The Akamai Blog」這邊可以看到。

17:21 UTC 發現問題,然後判斷超過 100Gbps,所以 17:26 決定讓 Akamai Prolexic 接管過濾:

At 17:21 UTC our network monitoring system detected an anomaly in the ratio of ingress to egress traffic and notified the on-call engineer and others in our chat system. This graph shows inbound versus outbound throughput over transit links:

Given the increase in inbound transit bandwidth to over 100Gbps in one of our facilities, the decision was made to move traffic to Akamai, who could help provide additional edge network capacity. At 17:26 UTC the command was initiated via our ChatOps tooling to withdraw BGP announcements over transit providers and announce AS36459 exclusively over our links to Akamai. Routes reconverged in the next few minutes and access control lists mitigated the attack at their border. Monitoring of transit bandwidth levels and load balancer response codes indicated a full recovery at 17:30 UTC. At 17:34 UTC routes to internet exchanges were withdrawn as a follow-up to shift an additional 40Gbps away from our edge.

就這樣而已,完全就是 PR 稿 XDDD