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GCP 推出 Cloud HSM (beta)

這算是 Google Cloud Platform 在補產品線,讓那些有強制使用 HSM 的需求的應用 (通常是遇到一定要 FIPS 140-2 的規範) 可以搬上雲端:「Introducing Cloud HSM beta for hardware crypto key security」。

從圖片上可以看到 LiquidSecurity,應該是「LiquidSecurity® General Purpose HSM Adapters and Appliances」這個產品:

如同 AWSCloudHSM 服務,GCP 的 Cloud HSM 也是提供 FIPS 140-2 Level 3:

Cloud HSM allows you to host encryption keys and perform cryptographic operations in FIPS 140-2 Level 3 certified HSMs (shown below).

演算法上,支援 AESRSAECC (NIST 的 P-256 與 P-384):

In addition to symmetric key encryption using AES-256 keys, you can now create various types of asymmetric keys for decryption or signing operations, which means that you can now store your keys used for PKI or code signing in a Google Cloud managed keystore. Specifically, RSA 2048, RSA 3072, RSA 4096, EC P256, and EC P384 keys will be available for signing operations, while RSA 2048, RSA 3072, and RSA 4096 keys will also have the ability to decrypt blocks of data.

目前只支援 us-east1us-west1,另外價錢也比軟體服務版本的 Cloud KMS 貴不少:

Billable itemFor keys with protection level SOFTWAREFor keys with protection level HSM
Active AES-256 and RSA 2048 key versions$0.06 per month$1.00 per month
Active RSA 3072, RSA 4096 or Elliptic Curve key versions$0.06 per month$2.50 per month for the first 2,000
$1.00 per month thereafter
Destroyed key versionsFreeFree
Key operations: Cryptographic$0.03 per 10,000 operations$0.03 per 10,000 operations for AES-256 and RSA 2048 keys
$0.15 per 10,000 operations for RSA 3072, RSA 4096, and Elliptic Curve keys
Key operations: AdminFreeFree

不過一般情況應該不會得用 CloudHSM,先有個印象就好...

AWS CloudHSM 支援 FIPS 140-2 Level 3 了

AWS CloudHSM 推出了一些新功能:「AWS CloudHSM Update – Cost Effective Hardware Key Management at Cloud Scale for Sensitive & Regulated Workloads」。

其中比較特別的是從以前只支援 Level 2 變成支援 Level 3 了:

More Secure – CloudHSM Classic (the original model) supports the generation and use of keys that comply with FIPS 140-2 Level 2. We’re stepping that up a notch today with support for FIPS 140-2 Level 3, with security mechanisms that are designed to detect and respond to physical attempts to access or modify the HSM.

在維基百科裡面有提到 Level 2 與 Level 3 的要求:

Security Level 2 improves upon the physical security mechanisms of a Security Level 1 cryptographic module by requiring features that show evidence of tampering, including tamper-evident coatings or seals that must be broken to attain physical access to the plaintext cryptographic keys and critical security parameters (CSPs) within the module, or pick-resistant locks on covers or doors to protect against unauthorized physical access.

In addition to the tamper-evident physical security mechanisms required at Security Level 2, Security Level 3 attempts to prevent the intruder from gaining access to CSPs held within the cryptographic module. Physical security mechanisms required at Security Level 3 are intended to have a high probability of detecting and responding to attempts at physical access, use or modification of the cryptographic module. The physical security mechanisms may include the use of strong enclosures and tamper-detection/response circuitry that zeroes all plaintext CSPs when the removable covers/doors of the cryptographic module are opened.

主動式偵測以及銷毀算是 Level 3 比 Level 2 安全的地方。

另外就是計價方式的修正,先前有一筆固定的費用,現在變成完全照小時計費了:

Pay As You Go – CloudHSM is now offered under a pay-as-you-go model that is simpler and more cost-effective, with no up-front fees.

Etsy 如何用 Let's Encrypt 的 SSL certificate 做生意...

Etsy 的「How Etsy Manages HTTPS and SSL Certificates for Custom Domains on Pattern」這篇文章講了如何用 Let's Encrypt 實作 Custom Domain。

主要是因為 Let's Encrypt 在設計時就考慮到的 auto-renew 機制,可以全自動處理後續的動作。這使得接 Let's Encrypt 比起接其他家來得容易 (而且省掉許多費用與合約上要處理的問題)。

文章後半段則是討論另外一個問題:當你有上千把 private key (& certificate) 時要怎麼管理,以確保這些 private key 都夠安全。其中有提到未來打算要引入 HSM

One of our stretch goals is to look into deploying HSMs. If there are bugs in the underlying software, the integrity of the entire system could be compromised thus voiding any guarantees we try to keep. While bugs are inevitable, moving critical cryptographic functions into secure hardware will mitigate their impact.

由於不太可能是把所有的 private key 塞到 HSM 裡面,應該是用 HSM 管理加密後的 private key,可以想像一下整個系統又會多了好幾個元件將責任拆開...

Apple 打算把 iCloud 加密用的 Key 放到用戶端

在經過最近 FBIApple 的戰鬥中 (FBI–Apple encryption dispute),Apple 正規劃把 iCloud 加密所使用的 key 放到用戶端裝置上,而非放在伺服器端:「Apple to Hand iCloud Encryption Key Management to Account Holders」:

In effect, Apple is following the lead of secure cloud services such as SpiderOak which has been offering what it calls “Zero Knowledge” cloud storage. By that, SpiderOak retains no information about whatever is stored in its cloud service, nor the means of gaining access to it.

也就是加解密都放在 client 端處理,server 端只是 storage。

這類型最大的問題是 server 端沒辦法運用資料,但 iCloud 的確可以放掉這些功能 (搜尋之類的),純粹當 storage 使用,藉以讓使用者自己裝置保護。

而蘋果在使用者的裝置上把類似於 HSM 的系統做的頗強大... 不知道 Android 有沒有機會也跟進。(雖然我自己是用 Apple 家的東西...)

Amazon EC2 預定要推出的 Dedicated Hosts

Amazon EC2 愈定要推出新的購買方案:「Coming Soon – EC2 Dedicated Hosts」。

Dedicated Hosts 的租用是以整台主機為單位,以確保整台實體機器不會有其他人使用,對安全性的要求會比較好。這邊拿 c3.xlarge 來舉例,一次就是八台的費用:(這邊「八台」的數字是未定的,真正的數字要等正式公告上線後才知道)

Each host has room for a predefined number of instances of a particular type. For example, a specific host could have room for eight c3.xlarge instances (this is a number that I made up for this post). After you allocate the host, you can then launch up to eight c3.xlarge instances on it.

會有這樣的需求主要還是因為有些軟體還沒有適當的 cloud-based licensing (授權方式),當 BYOL 時 (Bring Your Own License),會需要能夠對實體機器有更多控制權:

We want to make sure that you can continue to derive value from these licenses after you migrate to AWS. In general, we call this model Bring Your Own License, or BYOL. In order to do this while adhering to the terms of the license, you are going to need to control the mapping of the EC2 instances to the underlying, physical servers.

另外這對於安全性理由也多了個解決方案,像是需要實體分離避開各種 side-channel attack。不過 AWS 之前就有提供其他的方法。

對於軟體有支援 CloudHSM 的,可以考慮直接使用這個解決方案,private key 直接放在 HSM 上,而且 AWS 有符合常見的安全標準。

而另外對於有跟美國政府簽約的數據需求,可以用 AWS GovCloud (US),讓一般人根本接觸不到。

對於一般單位的需求,也可以用 Dedicated Instances 來確保實體機器上只有單一客戶,而這也能買 Reserved Instances 確保使用權,以及對應的折扣。

所以這次 Dedicated Hosts 比較像是商業授權上的需求而產生出來的解決方案,而不是安全性需求...

AWS 的 CloudHSM...

AWS 推出 CloudHSM 服務:「AWS CloudHSM - Secure Key Storage and Cryptographic Operations」。

不便宜,看起來是為了需要 NIST FIPS 140-2 需求而設的吧?跑的是 Luna SA - Ethernet-Attached HSM,可以達到 Level 3 的安全性...

然後遇到安全性時的老問題,要怎麼 audit:


感覺上是個口水戰,來拉板凳... XD

RSA SecurID 800 被破...

在「Scientists crack RSA SecurID 800 tokens, steal cryptographic keys」這篇報導裡提到了已經有辦法從 RSA SecurID 800 內取出 secret key,方法將會在 CRYPTO 2012 上發表...

RSA SecurID 800

(取自「RSA SecurID SID800 Authenticator Token」)

如果攻擊者可以碰觸到實體 token 並取出 secret key,他就可以準備一顆新的 token (HSM,Hardware security module) 把取出來的 secret key 灌進去,而原來的使用者不太容易會發現...

所以硬體式的 OTP 系統除了提供一次性密碼外,另外需要有能力阻擋從硬體取出 secret key 的能力。這次有能力在 13 分鐘就取出來,表示有不少辛苦事情要善後了...

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