curl 的 TLS fingerprint 偽裝專案 curl-impersonate 支援 Chrome 了

先前在「修正 Curl 的 TLS handshake,避開 bot 偵測機制」這邊提到 curl-impersonate 這個專案,試著修改 curl 的 TLS handshake fingerprint 讓偽裝的更好,本來只支援 Firefox,現在則是支援 Google Chrome 的 fingerprint 了...

作者寫的兩篇說明文章也可以看看:「Making curl impersonate Firefox」、「Impersonating Chrome, too」。

看起來愈來愈完整了,連 LD_PRELOAD 的用法也出現了,然後在 Arch Linux 上也出現 AUR 可以用了...

修正 Curl 的 TLS handshake,避開 bot 偵測機制

利用 TLS handshake 的 pattern 可以當作是某種 fingerprint,就可以知道你是用 Curl,這個方式在蠻多 CDN 都會用在 anti-bot 機制 (像是 Cloudflare),而剛剛看到有人投稿自己的 patch,試著將 Curl 修改成 Firefox 的 pattern:「curl-impersonate」,Hacker News 上的討論在這邊可以看到:「Show HN: Curl modified to impersonate Firefox and mimic its TLS handshake (」。

作者有提到這次的 patch 偏 hack,不太可能整進上游,但希望未來改的乾淨一點,然後整進上游:

I hope to do so in the future, for now the implementation is extremely hacky so I doubt it can get accepted into curl.

另外有人提出來說應該要用 Firefox ESR 版本的 pattern 而非 stable channel,也有人提出來說用 Google Chrome 的更好,不過我覺得有人開始做就已經很棒了 XD

更多瀏覽器內 GPU fingerprint 的技巧

在「Your device's GPU may be used for fingerprinting purposes」這邊看到有研究單位找出更多 GPU fingerprint 的技巧,論文在「DRAWNAPART: A Device Identification Technique based on Remote GPU Fingerprinting」這邊可以翻到,另外一些 source code 可以在 GitHub 上的「Drawn Apart」這邊可以翻到。

看起來是透過 WebGL 去建立模型:

The researchers ran experiments on 2500 unique devices using the technique. They developed two methods, both of which use the Web Graphics Library (WebGL), which is supported by all modern web browsers.


SSH 的 StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new

OpenSSH 在連到新的 host 時會跳出 key fingerprint 的資訊讓使用者確認,有時候為了自動化會用 StrictHostKeyChecking=no 避開,在 Lobsters Daily 上則看到了新的選項可以用,StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new

就如同選項的名字所描述的,查了一下 OpenSSH Release Notes 可以看到這是在 OpenSSH 7.5 導入的參數,是在 March 20, 2017 引入的:

* ssh(1): expand the StrictHostKeyChecking option with two new settings. The first "accept-new" will automatically accept hitherto-unseen keys but will refuse connections for changed or invalid hostkeys. This is a safer subset of the current behaviour of StrictHostKeyChecking=no. The second setting "off", is a synonym for the current behaviour of StrictHostKeyChecking=no: accept new host keys, and continue connection for hosts with incorrect hostkeys. A future release will change the meaning of StrictHostKeyChecking=no to the behaviour of "accept-new". bz#2400

對於一些自動化的流程應該夠用了,不需要到用 no 完全關掉。

翻了「Ubuntu – Package Search Results -- openssh-client」可以看到 18.04 之後都是 7.5 之後的版本了,支援度應該是沒什麼太大問題...


看到「Exploiting custom protocol handlers for cross-browser tracking in Tor, Safari, Chrome and Firefox」這個方式,跨瀏覽器收集 fingerprint 追蹤。

這次用的方式是透過 handler 追:

The scheme flooding vulnerability allows an attacker to determine which applications you have installed. In order to generate a 32-bit cross-browser device identifier, a website can test a list of 32 popular applications and check if each is installed or not. On average, the identification process takes a few seconds and works across desktop Windows, Mac and Linux operating systems.

最近大家比較常使用到的應該就是 Zoom 從網頁把應用程式帶起來的方式:

而要怎麼偵測的部份,用到了不同瀏覽器的 side channel。

Chromium 系列的部份對應的 ticket 在「Issue 1096610: External Protocol handler anti-flood protection is ineffective and flaky」這邊有被提出來。主要用到的方法是,在遇到有 handler 時,連打兩次時會被擋下:

被擋下後再打都會失敗,所以需要一個方式重設 flag,而內建的 Chrome PDF Viewer 剛好可以重設 flag:

The built-in Chrome PDF Viewer is an extension, so every time your browser opens a PDF file it resets the scheme flood protection flag. Opening a PDF file before opening a custom URL makes the exploit functional.

Firefox 的 side channel 則是可以透過 same-origin policy 測試當作 side channel,對應的 ticket 在「Scheme flooding technique for reliable cross-browser fingerprinting」這邊:

Every time you navigate to an unknown URL scheme, Firefox will show you an internal page with an error. This internal page has a different origin than any other website, so it is impossible to access it because of the Same-origin policy limitation. On the other hand, a known custom URL scheme will be opened as about:blank, whose origin will be accessible from the current website.

Safari 上的問題與 Firefox 一樣,不過沒登入看不到 ticket (也懶的註冊了):

You are not authorized to access bug #225769. To see this bug, you must first log in to an account with the appropriate permissions.

另外,雖然 Tor Browser 底層是 Firefox,但因為有改變預設值,所以攻擊者也得換方法:

Tor Browser is based on the Firefox source code, so the Same-origin policy trick was used here as well. But because Tor Browser does not show pop-ups, we used the same-origin policy trick with iframe elements instead.


Privacy Badger 預設關閉學習功能

Privacy Badger 是一個自動學習的 extension,可以學習 tracker 並且予以阻擋:

Privacy Badger automatically learns to block invisible trackers.

而這個自動學習功能在剛剛看到公告說明預設會關閉:「Privacy Badger Is Changing to Protect You Better」,主要是因為這個自動學習功能可以變成 fingerprint 資訊的一環:

The team also alerted us to a class of attacks that were enabled by Privacy Badger’s learning. Essentially, since Privacy Badger adapts its behavior based on the way that sites you visit behave, a dedicated attacker could manipulate the way Privacy Badger acts: what it blocks and what it allows. In theory, this can be used to identify users (a form of fingerprinting) or to extract some kinds of information from the pages they visit. This is similar to the set of vulnerabilities that Safari’s Intelligent Tracking Prevention feature disclosed and patched late last year.

所以現在變成會固定更新 pre-train ruleset 了:

From now on, Privacy Badger will rely solely on its “Badger Sett” pre-trained list of tracking domains to perform blocking by default. Furthermore, Privacy Badger’s tracker database will be refreshed periodically with the latest pre-trained definitions. This means, moving forward, all Privacy Badgers will default to relying on the same learned list of trackers for blocking.

當然這個功能還是可以手動開,但就有可能會被拿去 fingerprint 了,要開的人可以自己想一下... 不過不開的話就只是一個 ruleset 了 XD

有用的人可以自己考慮一下 XD

Google 用 x-client-data 追蹤使用者的問題

前陣子 Chromium 團隊在研究要移除 User-Agent 字串的事情 (參考「User-Agent 的淘汰提案」),結果 kiwibrowser 就直接炸下去,Google 很久前就會針對自家網站送出 x-client-data 這個 HTTP header,裡面足以辨識使用者瀏覽器的單一性:「Partial freezing of the User-Agent string#467」。

Google 的白皮書裡面是說用在 server 的試驗:

We want to build features that users want, so a subset of users may get a sneak peek at new functionality being tested before it’s launched to the world at large. A list of field trials that are currently active on your installation of Chrome will be included in all requests sent to Google. This Chrome-Variations header (X-Client-Data) will not contain any personally identifiable information, and will only describe the state of the installation of Chrome itself, including active variations, as well as server-side experiments that may affect the installation.

The variations active for a given installation are determined by a seed number which is randomly selected on first run. If usage statistics and crash reports are disabled, this number is chosen between 0 and 7999 (13 bits of entropy). If you would like to reset your variations seed, run Chrome with the command line flag “--reset-variation-state”. Experiments may be further limited by country (determined by your IP address), operating system, Chrome version and other parameters.

但因為這個預設值開啟的關係,就算關掉後也足以把使用者再分類到另外一個區塊,仍然具有高度辨識性,不是你 Google 說無法辨識就算數。

另外如果看 source code 裡的說明:

    // Note the criteria for attaching client experiment headers:
    // 1. We only transmit to Google owned domains which can evaluate
    // experiments.
    //    1a. These include hosts which have a standard postfix such as:
    //         * or * or
    //         exactly or
    //         international TLD domains *.google. or *.youtube..
    // 2. Only transmit for non-Incognito profiles.
    // 3. For the X-Client-Data header, only include non-empty variation IDs.

可以看到 ** 全部都是廣告相關,另外 Google 自家搜尋引擎是直接提供廣告 (不透過前面提到的網域),YouTube 也是一樣的情況,所以完全可以猜測 x-client-data 這個資料就是用在廣告相關的系統上。

The Register 在「Is Chrome really secretly stalking you across Google sites using per-install ID numbers? We reveal the truth」這邊用粗體的 Update 提到了 GDPR 的問題,不確定是不是開始有單位在調查了:

Updated Google is potentially facing a massive privacy and GDPR row over Chrome sending per-installation ID numbers to the mothership.

在這個問題沒修正之前,只能暫時用操作 HTTP header 的 extension 移掉這個欄位。

利用 Sensor 校正資訊產生 Device Fingerprint 的隱私攻擊

看到「Fingerprinting iPhones」這篇提出的攻擊,標題雖然是提到 iPhone,但實際上攻擊包括了 Android 的手機:

You are affected by this fingerprinting attack if you are using any iOS devices with the iOS version below 12.2, including the latest iPhone XS, iPhone XS Max, and iPhone XR. You are also likely to be affected if you are using a Pixel 2/3 device, although we hypothesise the generated fingerprint has less entropy and is unlikely to be globally unique. A SensorID can be generated by both apps and mobile websites and requires no user interaction.

目前 iPhone 升級到 12.2 之後可以緩解這個問題,Android 看起來還不清楚...

攻擊的方式是透過手機在出場前會使用外部的校正工具,找出手機內 sensor 所偵測到的值與實際值的差異,然後把這些資訊燒到韌體裡,當呼叫 API 時就可以修正給出比較正確的值。

而因為這些校正資訊幾乎每一隻手機都不一樣,而且不會因為重裝而變更 (即使 factory reset),加上還可以跨 app 與 web 追蹤,就成為這次攻擊的目標:

In the context of mobile devices, the main benefit of per-device calibration is that it allows more accurate attitude estimation.

資訊量其實相當大,透過 app 分析可以得到 67 bits entropy,透過網頁也有 42 bits entropy,而且不怎麼會變:

In general, it is difficult to create a unique fingerprint for iOS devices due to strict sandboxing and device homogeneity. However, we demonstrated that our approach can produce globally unique fingerprints for iOS devices from an installed app -- around 67 bits of entropy for the iPhone 6S. Calibration fingerprints generated by a website are less unique (~42 bits of entropy for the iPhone 6S), but they are orthogonal to existing fingerprinting techniques and together they are likely to form a globally unique fingerprint for iOS devices.

We have not observed any change in the SensorID of our test devices in the past half year. Our dataset includes devices running iOS 9/10/11/12. We have tested compass calibration, factory reset, and updating iOS (up until iOS 12.1); the SensorID always stays the same. We have also tried measuring the sensor data at different locations and under different temperatures; we confirm that these factors do not change the SensorID either.

目前提出來的解法是加入隨機值的噪音 (iOS 的作法),不過作者有建議預設應該要關閉 js 存取 sensor 的權限:

To mitigate this calibration fingerprint attack, vendors can add uniformly distributed random noise to ADC outputs before calibration is applied. Alternatively, vendors could round the sensor outputs to the nearest multiple of the nominal gain. Please refer to our paper for more details. In addition, we recommend privacy-focused mobile browsers add an option to disable the access to motion sensors via JavaScript. This could help protect Android devices and iOS devices that no longer receive updates from Apple.


解鎖 iPhone 的 Diper ID...

Twitter 上看到 Diper ID 這個糟糕的東西:


這明顯有資安問題啊 XDDD

Facebook 的智障防範措施...

Facebook 新的防範報復性照片計畫不少媒體都有報導了,我拿 Bruce Schneier 這篇來引用好了:「Facebook Fingerprinting Photos to Prevent Revenge Porn」。


According to a Facebook spokesperson, Facebook workers will have to review full, uncensored versions of nude images first, volunteered by the user, to determine if malicious posts by other users qualify as revenge porn.

智障... 結果裸照從這些管道先傳出去?