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這次 PKCS #1 1.5 的 ROBOT 攻擊,Cisco 沒打算修...

1998 年就發現的 security issue 因為 workaround 也很複雜,所以不是每一家都修對方法,於是 19 年後又被爆破了。這次叫做 ROBOT:「1998 attack that messes with sites’ secret crypto keys is back in a big way」。

可以看到中獎的表:

這次的攻擊在 client 端無法修正,只能在 server 端修正:

Do I need to update my browser?
No. This is an implementation bug in servers, there is nothing clients can do to prevent it.

如果 server 端無法盡快修正的話,想辦法避開 RSA encryption 可以躲開這個問題,而且因為現代瀏覽器都有非 RSA 的替代方案,這樣做應該都還有退路,可以維持連線的可能性:

Disable RSA encryption!
ROBOT only affects TLS cipher modes that use RSA encryption. Most modern TLS connections use an Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman key exchange and need RSA only for signatures. We believe RSA encryption modes are so risky that the only safe course of action is to disable them. Apart from being risky these modes also lack forward secrecy.

但使用 Cisco ACE 就哭了,因為 Cisco ACE 只支援 RSA encryption,而 Cisco 官方以產品線已經關閉,不再提供維護而沒有提供更新的計畫,所以就進入一個死胡同...

不過 Cisco 自己也還在用 Cisco ACE 就是了,不在意就不會痛的感覺 XD

I have a Cisco ACE device.
Cisco informed us that the ACE product line was discontinued several years ago and that they won't provide an update. Still, we found plenty of vulnerable hosts that use these devices.

These devices don't support any other cipher suites, therefore disabling RSA is not an option. To our knowledge it is not possible to use these devices for TLS connections in a secure way.

However, if you use these products you're in good company: As far as we can tell Cisco is using them to serve the cisco.com domain.

Savitech (盛微) 的 USB 音效驅動程式會安裝 Root CA (被發了 CVE-2017-9758)

Hacker News 上看到 CERT 的「Savitech USB audio drivers install a new root CA certificate」提到 Savitech USB audio driver 會安裝自己的 Root CA:

Savitech provides USB audio drivers for a number of specialized audio products. Some versions of the Savitech driver package silently install a root CA certificate into the Windows trusted root certificate store.

出自「Inaudible Subversion - Did your Hi-Fi just subvert your PC? (原網站已經無法訪問,參考備份連結 https://archive.is/K6REr)」,CVE 編號是 CVE-2017-9758,最初是由 n3kt0n 提出的:「某單位 drivers silently install certificate in trusted root certificate authorities store [CVE-2017-9758]」:

Mitre assigned this exposure the identifier CVE-2017-9758, but was initially tracked by HITCON ZeroDay project as ZD-2017-00386.

有兩把 CA public key 被塞進去。雖然目前還沒有徵兆 private key 有外洩,但還是建議儘快移除:

There is currently no evidence that the Savitech private key is compromised. However, users are encouraged to remove the certificate out of caution. The two known certificates are:

SaviAudio root certificate #1
‎Validity: Thursday, ‎May ‎31, ‎2012 - ‎Tuesday, ‎December ‎30, ‎2036
Serial number: 579885da6f791eb24de819bb2c0eeff0
Thumbprint: cb34ebad73791c1399cb62bda51c91072ac5b050

SaviAudio root certificate #2
Validity: ‎Thursday, ‎December ‎31, ‎2015 - ‎Tuesday, ‎December ‎30, ‎2036
Serial number: ‎972ed9bce72451bb4bd78bfc0d8b343c
Thumbprint: 23e50cd42214d6252d65052c2a1a591173daace5

另外 Savitech 也放出了新版的 driver,不包含 Root CA:

Savitech has released a new driver package to address the issue. Savitech drivers version 2.8.0.3 or later do not install the root CA certificate. Users still must remove any previously installed certificate manually.

看了一下說明,看起來是當時為了支援 Windows XP 而做的,但微軟已經不提供驅動程式的數位簽章了,所以就只好這樣搞...

AWS CloudHSM 支援 FIPS 140-2 Level 3 了

AWS CloudHSM 推出了一些新功能:「AWS CloudHSM Update – Cost Effective Hardware Key Management at Cloud Scale for Sensitive & Regulated Workloads」。

其中比較特別的是從以前只支援 Level 2 變成支援 Level 3 了:

More Secure – CloudHSM Classic (the original model) supports the generation and use of keys that comply with FIPS 140-2 Level 2. We’re stepping that up a notch today with support for FIPS 140-2 Level 3, with security mechanisms that are designed to detect and respond to physical attempts to access or modify the HSM.

在維基百科裡面有提到 Level 2 與 Level 3 的要求:

Security Level 2 improves upon the physical security mechanisms of a Security Level 1 cryptographic module by requiring features that show evidence of tampering, including tamper-evident coatings or seals that must be broken to attain physical access to the plaintext cryptographic keys and critical security parameters (CSPs) within the module, or pick-resistant locks on covers or doors to protect against unauthorized physical access.

In addition to the tamper-evident physical security mechanisms required at Security Level 2, Security Level 3 attempts to prevent the intruder from gaining access to CSPs held within the cryptographic module. Physical security mechanisms required at Security Level 3 are intended to have a high probability of detecting and responding to attempts at physical access, use or modification of the cryptographic module. The physical security mechanisms may include the use of strong enclosures and tamper-detection/response circuitry that zeroes all plaintext CSPs when the removable covers/doors of the cryptographic module are opened.

主動式偵測以及銷毀算是 Level 3 比 Level 2 安全的地方。

另外就是計價方式的修正,先前有一筆固定的費用,現在變成完全照小時計費了:

Pay As You Go – CloudHSM is now offered under a pay-as-you-go model that is simpler and more cost-effective, with no up-front fees.

Telegram 使用 CDN 加速下載

Telegram 說明他們將會使用 CDN 加速:「More Speed and Security!」。

資料在 CDN 的節點上是加密的,金鑰需要透過 Telegram 的 key server 提供:

While these caching nodes are only used to temporarily store public media (imagine Telegram versions of superpopular YouTube hits), all data that goes through them is encrypted with a key unknown to the caching nodes. In other words, we treat these CDN caching nodes just like we treat your internet provider – they only ever get encrypted junk they can't decipher.

但這表示 Telegram 本身有能力解開這些資料?不知道這邊講的是什麼行為...

使用者如果選擇願意公開的話當然沒問題,但這種情況下也不需要 CDN 加密;而當使用者不願意公開時,應該是期望 Telegram 也無法解開這些資料?再來看看到底是怎麼樣的功能要上 CDN?

AES-GCM-SIV

在「AES-GCM-SIV: Specification and Analysis」這邊看到 AES-GCM-SIV 的作者自己投稿上去的資料,是個已經被放進 BoringSSL 並且在 QUIC 上使用的演算法:

We remark that AES-GCM-SIV is already integrated into Google's BoringSSL library \cite{BoringSSL}, and its deployment for ticket encryption in QUIC \cite{QUIC} is underway.

在 RFC 上的說明解釋了這個演算法的目的是希望當 nonce 沒有被正確實作時仍然可以有比 AES-GCM 強的保護:

This memo specifies two authenticated encryption algorithms that are nonce misuse-resistant - that is that they do not fail catastrophically if a nonce is repeated.

在 128 bits 的情況下,加密的速度大約是 AES-GCM 的 2/3 (在都有硬體加速的情況下),但解密的速度則與 AES-GCM 相當:

For encryption, it is slower than AES-GCM, because achieving nonce-misuse resistance requires, by definition, two (serialized) passes over the data. Nevertheless, optimized implementations run GCM-SIV (for 128-bit keys) at less than one cycle per byte on modern processors (roughly 2/3 of the speed of nonce-respecting AES-GCM). On the other hand, GCM-SIV decryption runs at almost the same speed as AES-GCM.

不過這就是 trade-off 了,如果 nonce 有正確被實作的話,其實不需要這個...

Amazon Redshift 可以讀 S3 裡被 KMS 加密過的資料了

清資料時發現支援了:「Amazon Redshift now supports encrypting unloaded data using Amazon S3 server-side encryption with AWS KMS keys」:

The Amazon Redshift UNLOAD command now supports Amazon S3 server-side encryption using an AWS KMS key.

這樣資料丟上 Amazon S3 時可以透過 AWS KMS 加密保存,而 Amazon Redshift 可以透過 KMS 直接拉出來,處理起來會方便不少...

不過 Amazon Athena 好像還是沒辦法?

前陣子在 Black Hat 上發表的 HEIST 攻擊 (對 HTTPS 的攻擊)

又是一個對 HTTPS 的攻擊:「HEIST attack on SSL/TLS can grab personal info, Black Hat」、「New attack steals SSNs, e-mail addresses, and more from HTTPS pages」。

一樣是 Compression 產生的 side-channel attack,只是這次是結合 TCP window size 的攻擊。投影片可以在「HTTP Encrypted Information can be Stolen through TCP-windows (PDF)」這邊看到。

這次的攻擊只需要在瀏覽器上插入 HTTP 產生 HTTPS 的流量,然後從旁邊看 HTTPS 連線的 TCP packet 就可以了,而且對 HTTP/2 也很有效:

而且很不幸的,目前沒有太好的解法,因為所有的攻擊手法都是照著使用者無法發現的路徑進行的 @_@

對於使用者,大量使用 HTTPS (像是 HTTPS Everywhere 這樣的套件),能夠降低政府單位與 ISP 將 javascript 插入 HTTP 連線,產生 HTTPS 的行為。

而對於網站端來說,全站都隨機產生不同長度的 HTTP header 可能是個增加破解難度的方式 (而且不會太難做,可以透過 apache module 或是 nginx module 做到),但還是可以被統計方法再推算出來。

不知道有沒有辦法只對 HTTPS 開 javascript,雖然攻擊者還是可以用 <img> 攻擊...

也許以後 HTTP/3 之類的協定會有一區是不壓縮只加密的,避開這類 compression-based attack @_@

CIA 老大告訴參議員,在加密系統裡放後門是可行的,因為沒有公司可以逃離美國魔掌

如同標題講的,CIA 老大 John Brennan 告訴參議員,因為實務上不存在「Non-US encryption」,所以強制任何要進入美國的企業使用美版帶有後門的加密系統是可行的:「Non-US encryption is 'theoretical,' claims CIA chief in backdoor debate」。

CIA director John Brennan told US senators they shouldn't worry about mandatory encryption backdoors hurting American businesses.

And that's because, according to Brennan, there's no one else for people to turn to: if they don't want to use US-based technology because it's been forced to use weakened cryptography, they'll be out of luck because non-American solutions are simply "theoretical."

這位腦袋已經壞掉了啊,你知道有個叫做 China,拼做 C-h-i-n-a 的經濟體系嗎... 然後中美共用同一套有後門的加密系統瞬間就會被一堆人打槍,如果真的發生,還有個歐盟... 而且這些事情只是促進以色列的安全系統加速脫離美國掌控啊?以色列才是目前資安的超級強國啊...

這世界上有太多已經不是掌握在美國的東西了啊...

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