Home » Posts tagged "domain"

WebKit 對 HSTS Super Cookie 提出的改法

Twitter 上看到 WebKitHSTS 所產生的 Super Cookie 提出的改善方案:

拿原文的例子來說明,先指定一個隨機數給 user,像是 8396804 (二進位是 100000000010000000000100),所以就存取下面的網址:

https://bit02.example.com
https://bit13.example.com
https://bit23.example.com

在存取這些 HTTPS 網址時都會指定 HSTS,所以之後連到這三個網址的 HTTP request 就不會觸發到 HTTP 版本,會因為 HSTS 被轉到 HTTPS 版本。於是就可以用 32 個 HTTP request 測試 32bits 而判斷出身份。(當然你可以用更多)

WebKit 提出的改善方案大概有幾種,主要是就觀察到的現象來限制。

第一種解法「Mitigation 1: Limit HSTS State to the Hostname, or the Top Level Domain + 1」是因為會看到這樣的設計:

https://a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.example.com
https://a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.example.com
https://a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.example.com
https://a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.example.com
https://a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.example.com
https://a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.example.com
https://a.a.a.a.a.a.a.example.com
…etc...
https://bit00.example.com
https://bit01.example.com
https://bit02.example.com
...etc...
https://bit64.example.com

所以提出的方案是只有目前網站的 domain 以及 top domain + 1 (像是 example.com) 可以被設定 HSTS:

Telemetry showed that attackers would set HSTS across a wide range of sub-domains at once. Because using HSTS in this way does not benefit legitimate use cases, but does facilitate tracking, we revised our network stack to only permit HSTS state to be set for the loaded hostname (e.g., “https://a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.a.example.com”), or the Top Level Domain + 1 (TLD+1) (e.g., “https://example.com”).

但其實廣告主只需要註冊 32 domains (或是 64) 就可以避開這個問題。

第二種是「Mitigation 2: Ignore HSTS State for Subresource Requests to Blocked Domains」,如果在 HTTPS 頁面上,某個 domain 的 cookie 已經因為某些原因被阻擋 (像是手動設定),那麼就忽略掉 HSTS 的設計:

We modified WebKit so that when an insecure third-party subresource load from a domain for which we block cookies (such as an invisible tracking pixel) had been upgraded to an authenticated connection because of dynamic HSTS, we ignore the HSTS upgrade request and just use the original URL. This causes HSTS super cookies to become a bit string consisting only of zeroes.

後面這點在現在因為 SEO 設計而使得各大網站都往 HTTPS 方向走,應該會有些幫助吧...

SSL Certificate 的認證方式限縮

在「Ballot 218 - Remove validation methods 1 and 5 - CAB Forum」看到「Ballot 218: Remove validation methods #1 and #5」這則議案以 78% 的同意票通過,限縮 SSL Certificate 的認證方式。眼睛瞄到中華電信投下反對票:

14 Yes votes: CFCA, Cisco, Comodo CA, D-TRUST, DigiCert, GDCA, GlobalSign, GoDaddy, Izenpe, Let’s Encrypt, Logius PKIoverheid, SSL.com, TrustCor, Trustwave

4 No votes: Buypass, Chunghwa Telecom, Entrust Datacard, SwissSign

4 Abstain: Actalis, Disig, HARICA, OATI

78% of voting CAs voted in favor

找了一下在 BR (Baseline Requirements) 的 3.2.2.4.1 與 3.2.2.4.5,其中前者是透過註冊商認證:

3.2.2.4.1 Validating the Applicant as a Domain Contact

Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by validating the Applicant is the Domain Contact directly with the Domain Name Registrar.

後者是透過文件認證:

3.2.2.4.5 Domain Authorization Document

Confirming the Applicant's control over the FQDN by relying upon the attestation to the authority of the Applicant to request a Certificate contained in a Domain Authorization Document.

在想投下反對的原因,會不會是因為中華自己的 domain 應該都是透過後者方式發的?透過內部公文系統...

用 Amazon Route 53 做 Service Discovery

Amazon Route 53 的新功能,可以解決以前自己要建立 Service Discovery 服務的工作:「Amazon Route 53 Releases Auto Naming API for Service Name Management and Discovery」。官方的文件在「Using Autonaming for Service Discovery」這邊。

不過目前有些限制,一個 namespace (domain name) 目前只能有五個服務:

DNS settings for up to five records.

然後 DNS 回應時,最多回八個 record:

When Amazon Route 53 receives a DNS query for the name of an instance, such as backend.example.com, it responds with up to eight IP addresses (for A or AAAA records) or up to eight SRV record values.

回應八個 record,但應該是可以註冊超過八個吧... (i.e. 每次都回不一樣)

自建服務 (像是 Cassandra 或是 ScyllaDB) 可以直接用這個服務掛上去,就不用自己架 Consul 了。

目前支援了這四區,亞洲不在這波提供範圍:

Amazon Route 53 Auto Naming is available in US East (N. Virginia), US East (Ohio), US West (Oregon), and EU (Ireland) regions.

PChome 修正了問題,以及 RFC 4074 的說明

早些時候測試發現 PChome 已經修正了之前提到的問題:「PChome 24h 連線會慢的原因...」、「PChome 24h 連線會慢的原因... (續篇)」,這邊除了整理一下以外,也要修正之前文章裡的錯誤。

在 RFC 4074 (Common Misbehavior Against DNS Queries for IPv6 Addresses) 裡面提到了當你只有 IPv4 address 時,DNS server 要怎麼回應的問題。

在「3. Expected Behavior」說明了正確的作法,當只有 A RR 沒有 AAAA RR 的時候,應該要傳回 NOERROR,而 answer section 裡面不要放東西:

Suppose that an authoritative server has an A RR but has no AAAA RR for a host name. Then, the server should return a response to a query for an AAAA RR of the name with the response code (RCODE) being 0 (indicating no error) and with an empty answer section (see Sections 4.3.2 and 6.2.4 of [1]). Such a response indicates that there is at least one RR of a different type than AAAA for the queried name, and the stub resolver can then look for A RRs.

在「4.2. Return "Name Error"」裡提到,如果傳回 NXDOMAIN (3),表示查詢的這個名稱完全沒有 RR,而不僅僅限於 AAAA record,這就是我犯的錯誤 (在前面的文章建議傳回 NXDOMAIN):

This type of server returns a response with RCODE 3 ("Name Error") to a query for an AAAA RR, indicating that it does not have any RRs of any type for the queried name.

With this response, the stub resolver may immediately give up and never fall back. Even if the resolver retries with a query for an A RR, the negative response for the name has been cached in the caching server, and the caching server will simply return the negative response. As a result, the stub resolver considers this to be a fatal error in name resolution.

Several examples of this behavior are known to the authors. As of this writing, all have been fixed.

PChome 這次的修正回應了正確的值 (而不是我提到的 NXDOMAIN):

$ dig shopping.gs1.pchome.com.tw aaaa @ns1.gs1.pchome.com.tw

; <<>> DiG 9.9.5-3ubuntu0.16-Ubuntu <<>> shopping.gs1.pchome.com.tw aaaa @ns1.gs1.pchome.com.tw
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 40767
;; flags: qr aa rd ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 1280
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;shopping.gs1.pchome.com.tw.    IN      AAAA

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
gs1.pchome.com.tw.      5       IN      SOA     ns1.gs1.pchome.com.tw. root.dns.pchome.com.tw. 20171123 3600 3 3600 5

;; Query time: 16 msec
;; SERVER: 210.242.216.91#53(210.242.216.91)
;; WHEN: Fri Nov 24 01:44:52 CST 2017
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 134

另外 RFC 也有一些其他的文件可以參考,像是 RFC 2308 (Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS NCACHE))、RFC 4697 (Observed DNS Resolution Misbehavior) 以及 RFC 8020 (NXDOMAIN: There Really Is Nothing Underneath),這些文件描述了蠻多常見的問題以及正確的處理方法,讀完對於現在愈來愈複雜的 DNS 架構有不少幫助。

Happy Eyeballs (RFC 6555)

在「PChome 24h 連線會慢的原因...」這篇的 comment 有讀者提到了 Happy Eyeballs 應該可以解決這個問題:

除了可以在維基百科上面看到外,比較正式的說明可以參考 RFC 6555:「Happy Eyeballs: Success with Dual-Stack Hosts」,其中在「6. Example Algorithm」就有提到 Google ChromeMozilla Firefox 怎麼實做 Happy Eyeballs:

What follows is the algorithm implemented in Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox.

  1. Call getaddinfo(), which returns a list of IP addresses sorted by the host's address preference policy.
  2. Initiate a connection attempt with the first address in that list (e.g., IPv6).
  3. If that connection does not complete within a short period of time (Firefox and Chrome use 300 ms), initiate a connection attempt with the first address belonging to the other address family (e.g., IPv4).
  4. The first connection that is established is used. The other connection is discarded.

If an algorithm were to cache connection success/failure, the caching would occur after step 4 determined which connection was successful.

Other example algorithms include [Perreault] and [Andrews].

可以看到 Happy Eyeballs 的演算法是要避免 IPv6 network 不通的情況卡住很慢 (如果在 300ms 內連線沒有建起來,就會儘快往另外一個 address family 嘗試),而不是在 DNS 層避免問題 (也就是 getaddinfo() 觸發的 DNS query)。

這次的情況是 DNS query 很慢,就會導致還是一開始就很慢,Happy Eyeballs 沒辦法解決這個問題。

不過話說回來,我是有印象知道有這個演算法,但不知道有「Happy Eyeballs」這個這麼逗趣的名字... (掩面)

PChome 24h 連線會慢的原因...

Update:續篇請參考「PChome 24h 連線會慢的原因... (續篇)」。

tl;dr:因為他們的 DNS servers 不會對 IPv6 的 AAAA record 正確的回應 NXDOMAIN,導致 DNS resolver 會不斷嘗試。

好像一行就把原因講完了啊,還是多寫一些細節好了。

起因於我的電腦連 PChome 24h 時常常會卡住,Google Chrome 會寫「Resolving host...」,於是就花了些時間找這個問題。

一開始先用幾個工具測試,發現 host 會卡,但不知道卡什麼:

$ host 24h.pchome.com.tw

tcpdump 出來聽的時候發現 host 會跑 AAAAA 以及 MX 三個種類,而後面兩個都會卡住:

24h.pchome.com.tw is an alias for shopping.gs1.pchome.com.tw.
shopping.gs1.pchome.com.tw has address 210.242.43.53
;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached
;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached

這樣就有方向了... 我的電腦是 Dual-stack network (同時有 IPv4 address 與 IPv6 address),所以可以預期 Google Chrome 會去查 IPv6 address。而國內很多網站都還沒有把有 IPv6 的情境當標準測試,很容易中獎...

有了方向後,用 dig 測試 IPv6 的 AAAA,發現都是給 SERVFAIL,而且多跑幾次就發現會卡住:

$ dig 24h.pchome.com.tw aaaa @168.95.192.1

然後對 {cheetah,dns,dns2,dns3,wolf}.pchome.com.tw (上層登記的) 與 dns4.pchome.com.tw (實際多的) 測,可以拿到 CNAME record,像是這樣:

$ dig 24h.pchome.com.tw aaaa @dns.pchome.com.tw

; <<>> DiG 9.9.5-3ubuntu0.16-Ubuntu <<>> 24h.pchome.com.tw aaaa @dns.pchome.com.tw
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 26037
;; flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 5, ADDITIONAL: 6
;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;24h.pchome.com.tw.             IN      AAAA

;; ANSWER SECTION:
24h.pchome.com.tw.      300     IN      CNAME   shopping.gs1.pchome.com.tw.

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
gs1.pchome.com.tw.      300     IN      NS      ns3.gs1.pchome.com.tw.
gs1.pchome.com.tw.      300     IN      NS      ns1.gs1.pchome.com.tw.
gs1.pchome.com.tw.      300     IN      NS      ns4.gs1.pchome.com.tw.
gs1.pchome.com.tw.      300     IN      NS      ns5.gs1.pchome.com.tw.
gs1.pchome.com.tw.      300     IN      NS      ns2.gs1.pchome.com.tw.

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns1.gs1.pchome.com.tw.  300     IN      A       210.242.216.91
ns2.gs1.pchome.com.tw.  300     IN      A       210.242.216.92
ns3.gs1.pchome.com.tw.  300     IN      A       210.242.43.93
ns4.gs1.pchome.com.tw.  300     IN      A       203.69.38.91
ns5.gs1.pchome.com.tw.  300     IN      A       210.71.147.91

;; Query time: 12 msec
;; SERVER: 210.59.230.85#53(210.59.230.85)
;; WHEN: Wed Nov 22 11:05:24 CST 2017
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 243

但往 ns{1,2,3,4,5}.gs1.pchome.com.tw 問的時候給不出答案,也不給 NXDOMAIN,像是這樣:

$ dig shopping.gs1.pchome.com.tw aaaa @ns1.gs1.pchome.com.tw

; <<>> DiG 9.9.5-3ubuntu0.16-Ubuntu <<>> shopping.gs1.pchome.com.tw aaaa @ns1.gs1.pchome.com.tw
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 36249
;; flags: qr rd ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 5, ADDITIONAL: 6
;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 1280
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;shopping.gs1.pchome.com.tw.    IN      AAAA

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
gs1.pchome.com.tw.      3600    IN      NS      ns3.gs1.pchome.com.tw.
gs1.pchome.com.tw.      3600    IN      NS      ns4.gs1.pchome.com.tw.
gs1.pchome.com.tw.      3600    IN      NS      ns5.gs1.pchome.com.tw.
gs1.pchome.com.tw.      3600    IN      NS      ns1.gs1.pchome.com.tw.
gs1.pchome.com.tw.      3600    IN      NS      ns2.gs1.pchome.com.tw.

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns3.gs1.pchome.com.tw.  3600    IN      A       210.242.43.93
ns4.gs1.pchome.com.tw.  3600    IN      A       203.69.38.91
ns5.gs1.pchome.com.tw.  3600    IN      A       210.71.147.91
ns1.gs1.pchome.com.tw.  3600    IN      A       210.242.216.91
ns2.gs1.pchome.com.tw.  3600    IN      A       210.242.216.92

;; Query time: 11 msec
;; SERVER: 210.242.216.91#53(210.242.216.91)
;; WHEN: Wed Nov 22 11:07:17 CST 2017
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 310

於是 DNS resolver 就倒在路邊了...

Google 的 .search 網域

Netcraft 的「November 2017 Web Server Survey」這篇看到關於 Google 弄到的 .search 網域:

This month the controversial new .search gTLD being run by Google’s Charleston Road Registry subsidiary was found for the first time, with www.nic.search responding to the survey. Google hopes it will be able to run .search as a dotless domain which will automatically redirect users to their search engine of choice. This proposal has been criticised for going against ICANN’s own rules, which prohibits this functionality due to the potential for conflicts with existing names on internal networks. This feature could also cause confusion for users who have come to expect that typing words into their address bar will perform a search query for that term.

It is currently uncertain whether or not Google will be allowed to run the .search TLD as a dotless domain, however with the launch of the first site on this TLD this month Google is one step closer to the provision of this service.

找了一下資料,ICANNWiki 上的「.search」有些資料,另外也有新聞資訊 (2013 年的):「Google Wants To Operate .Search As A “Dotless” Domain, Plans To Open .Cloud, .Blog And .App To Others」。

不太妙...

新的 DNS Resolver:9.9.9.9

看到新的 DNS Resolver 服務,也拿到了還不錯的 IP address,9.9.9.9:「New “Quad9” DNS service blocks malicious domains for everyone」,服務網站是「Quad 9 | Internet Security and Privacy in a Few Easy Steps」,主打宣稱過濾已知的危險站台...

由政府單位、IBM 以及 Packet Clearing House 成立的:

The Global Cyber Alliance (GCA)—an organization founded by law enforcement and research organizations to help reduce cyber-crime—has partnered with IBM and Packet Clearing House to launch a free public Domain Name Service system.

也就是說,後面三家都不是專門做網路服務的廠商... 於是就會發現連 Client Subnet in DNS Queries (RFC 7871) 都沒提供,於是查出來的地區都不對,這對使用 DNS resolver 位置分配 CDN 節點的服務很傷啊... (或是其他類似服務)

這是 GooglePublic DNS (8.8.8.8) 查出來的:

;; ANSWER SECTION:
i.kfs.io.               576     IN      CNAME   kwc.kkcube.com.country.mp.kkcube.com.
kwc.kkcube.com.country.mp.kkcube.com. 21599 IN CNAME TW.kwc.kkcube.com.
TW.kwc.kkcube.com.      188     IN      CNAME   i.kfs.io.cdn.cloudflare.net.
i.kfs.io.cdn.cloudflare.net. 299 IN     A       104.16.244.238
i.kfs.io.cdn.cloudflare.net. 299 IN     A       104.16.245.238

;; Query time: 28 msec
;; SERVER: 8.8.8.8#53(8.8.8.8)
;; WHEN: Sat Nov 18 05:30:23 CST 2017
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 181

這是 Quad9 (9.9.9.9) 查出來的:

;; ANSWER SECTION:
i.kfs.io.               1800    IN      CNAME   kwc.kkcube.com.country.mp.kkcube.com.
kwc.kkcube.com.country.mp.kkcube.com. 42702 IN CNAME US.kwc.kkcube.com.
US.kwc.kkcube.com.      300     IN      CNAME   i.kfs.io.cdn.cloudflare.net.
i.kfs.io.cdn.cloudflare.net. 300 IN     A       104.16.245.238
i.kfs.io.cdn.cloudflare.net. 300 IN     A       104.16.244.238

;; Query time: 294 msec
;; SERVER: 9.9.9.9#53(9.9.9.9)
;; WHEN: Sat Nov 18 05:30:27 CST 2017
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 181

再來一點是,在科技領域相信政府單位通常都是一件錯誤的事情,我 pass... XD

掃網域下主機名稱的方式...

原文是講滲透測試的前置作業,需要將某個特定 domain 下的主機名稱掃出來:「A penetration tester’s guide to sub-domain enumeration」。

最直接的還是 DNS zone transfer (AXFR),如果管理者沒設好 DNS server 的話,這會是最快的方式。當沒有這個方法時就要用各種其他方式來掃了。

看了一下有幾種方式:

應該有人可以提到所有的東西再寫成程式 XD

Stream 對 .io 的感冒

Stream 的人寫了一篇「Why Stream Stopped Using .IO Domain Names for Production Traffic」表達他們對 .io 的感冒...

主要是因為 9/20 爛掉的情況不太妙。第一個是 .io 爛掉了兩個小時 (以月來算 SLA 就等於直接掉了 0.2% uptime,變成不到 99.8%),第二個是爛掉時 server 傳回的不是 SERVFAIL,而是 NXDOMAIN

The outage lasted for almost 2 hours, during which 1/5th of DNS queries for any .getstream.io record would fail.

他們的解法是改到 .com 上,畢竟影響的時候應該會修得比較快。另外文章裡也有延伸提到 Amazon Route 53 爛掉時要怎麼辦,如果他們真的決定要解決的話,應該是會拿出像「StackOverflow 對於多 DNS 商的同步方式...」或是「GitHub 也自己搞了一套管理多家 DNS 的程式...」的搞法吧。

不過這的確是當初選 .io 沒預料到的...

Archives