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Comodo 取消對 WoSign CA 的 Cross-signed

剛剛看到 ComodoRob Stradling 在群組上說明了 Comodo 透過 CRLOCSP 取消對 WoSign CA 的 cross-signed:「Incidents involving the CA WoSign」。

Today we have revoked (via CRL and OCSP) all 3 of the cross-certificates that we'd issued to WoSign:

https://crt.sh/?id=3223853
https://crt.sh/?id=12716343
https://crt.sh/?id=12716433

See also:
https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=906611#c2

然後另外也看到在倫敦與 Qihoo 360StartCom 以及 WoSign 的會面也已經結束了,接下來 Mozilla 會討論新的計畫後更新上來:「WoSign and StartCom: next steps」。

iOS 阻擋 WoSign 憑證

mozilla.dev.security.policy 上看到有人行動了:「Apple's response to the WoSign incidents」。這使得 Apple 成為 WoSign 事件中第一個行動的單位。

Apple 這次先把 WoSign 放入 iOS 憑證清單的黑名單公告在這邊:「Blocking Trust for WoSign CA Free SSL Certificate G2」。

WoSign 在 iOS 產品線中是靠 StartComComodo 的交叉簽章,所以如果 Apple 只想擋 WoSign 憑證的話,必須以阻擋 Intermediate CA 的方式避開:

Although no WoSign root is in the list of Apple trusted roots, this intermediate CA used cross-signed certificate relationships with StartCom and Comodo to establish trust on Apple products.

不過為了降低對 user 的影響,這次的阻擋會有例外。當 CT log server 在 2016-09-19 前收到的 SSL certificate 還是會信任 (要注意的重點是,這邊的日期不是簽發,是送到 CT log server 上):

To avoid disruption to existing WoSign certificate holders and to allow their transition to trusted roots, Apple products will trust individual existing certificates issued from this intermediate CA and published to public Certificate Transparency log servers by 2016-09-19.

接下來會開始更深入的調查 WoSign 與 StartCom:

As the investigation progresses, we will take further action on WoSign/StartCom trust anchors in Apple products as needed to protect users.

另外本來的棚子裡,Qihoo 360 與 StartCom 正式提出要求在 2016/10/04 與 Mozilla 的人面對面討論 (在英國):「WoSign and StartCom: next steps」:

Following the publication of the recent investigative report, representatives of Qihoo 360 and StartCom have requested a face-to-face meeting with Mozilla. We have accepted, and that meeting will take place next Tuesday in London.

繼續來看進度... 下個禮拜應該會有更多的資料出來。

Comodo 發出微軟 live.fi 的 SSL Certificate...

在「Microsoft Blacklists Fake Finnish Certificate」這邊看到出包,引用的報導來自「Microsoft Blacklists Fake Certificate」,微軟的安全性通知則是在「Microsoft Security Advisory 3046310 (Improperly Issued Digital Certificates Could Allow Spoofing)」這邊。

原因是因為 hostmaster 這個使用者名稱沒有擋下來不讓使用者註冊:

In fact, he reports that he was able to register the alias "Hostmaster@live.fi", which he then used to obtain a legitimate HTTPS certificate for Live.fi via Comodo, which is the world's largest digital certificate authority.

這件事情拉出了對於「認證」一直沒有標準可以遵循的問題,大致上只有「RFC 2142 - Mailbox Names for Common Services, Roles and Functions」有列出一些常用的 username,其他的就沒印象了。CA/Browser Forum 不知道有沒有對應的標準...

Comodo 的 PrivDog 更厲害:直接關掉 CA Certificate 檢查

感覺接下來的整個月會拿有無窮無盡的 Superfish-like 新聞,下次如果出現 NSA 或是 GCHQ 已經在用這些漏洞的話也不太意外就是了:「Adware Privdog worse than Superfish」。

PrivDogComodo 發行的 adware,比起 Superfish 更厲害,直接把 CA Certificate 的檢查關掉:

It will turn your Browser into one that just accepts every HTTPS certificate out there, whether it's been signed by a certificate authority or not.

而 Comodo 是發行 SSL certificate 的公司,很多便宜的 SSL certificate 都是由他們家發出來的... (包括我的 blog)

網路愈來愈不安全,能自救的方式並不多...

這兩件事情加起來會不會太巧合...

首先是有攻擊者成功利用 Comodo CA 產生 www.google.comlogin.yahoo.comlogin.skype.comaddons.mozilla.orglogin.live.com 的 SSL certificate:「Report of incident on 15-MAR-2011」,雖然被 revoke (撤銷),但是我們知道 revoke 機制極度脆弱:「Revocation doesn't work」。

過沒幾天,有人發現 AT&TFacebook 的流量會流經中國 ISP 的網路設備:「Facebook traffic mysteriously passes through Chinese ISP」。

關於這幾件事情,我們能做的並不多,只能僅可能的做:

接下來就是祈禱了...

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