1) Subject: CN=CA 沃通根证书, OU=null, O=WoSign CA Limited, C=CN
2) Subject: CN=Certification Authority of WoSign, OU=null, O=WoSign CA Limited, C=CN
3) Subject: CN=Certification Authority of WoSign G2, OU=null, O=WoSign CA Limited, C=CN
4) Subject: CN=CA WoSign ECC Root, OU=null, O=WoSign CA Limited, C=CN
5) Subject: CN=StartCom Certification Authority, OU=Secure Digital Certificate Signing, O=StartCom Ltd., C=IL
6) Subject: CN=StartCom Certification Authority, OU=Secure Digital Certificate Signing, O=StartCom Ltd., C=IL
7) Subject: CN=StartCom Certification Authority G2, OU=null, O=StartCom Ltd., C=IL
首先是認定這一連串的事件是惡意行為：
Based on the information that I have seen regarding WoSign, I believe that WoSign intentionally bent the rules in order to continue issuing SHA-1 SSL certs, when they knew full well that was no longer allowed. I also believe that the deception continued even after Mozilla directly asked WoSign about this. WoSign has lost my confidence in their ability and intention to follow Mozilla's policies.
Therefore, I think we should respond similarly to WoSign as we did to CNNIC [1][2]. Unfortunately, the number of certificates and the timescales involved are such that we prefer not to create a list of the domains for which previously-issued certs that chain up to the Affected Roots may continue to be trusted, so our approach will be a little different, as Gerv previously described[3].
1) Distrust certificates chaining up to Affected Roots with a notBefore date after October 21, 2016. If additional back-dating is discovered (by any means) to circumvent this control, then Mozilla will immediately and permanently revoke trust in the Affected Roots.
-- This change will go into the Firefox 51 release train [4].
-- The code will use the subject key id (hash of public key) to identify the Affected Roots, so that the control will also apply to cross-certs of the Affected Roots.
然後將之前簽出來的 SHA-1 憑證列入 OneCRL：
2) Add the previously identified backdated SHA-1 certs chaining up to the Affected Roots to OneCRL.
另外一個非常大的事情是，Mozilla 將永久不信任安永香港的稽核報告：
3) No longer accept audits carried out by Ernst & Young Hong Kong.
Gervase Markham 做了補充「永久」的部份：
To be clear, this is a permanent ban, applicable worldwide, but only to the Hong Kong branch of E&Y. (If further issues are found with E&Y audits elsewhere, then we might consider something with wider scope.)
從頭說明，事情發生於八月底的時候 Google 通知了 Mozilla 一連串 WoSign 出包卻沒有主動通報的事件，當時知道的大約有三或四件。而在 mozilla.dev.security.policy 不斷的討論的情況下，由於關注度變得超高，在搜尋大量的資料下發現更多問題，到現在 Mozilla 的 wiki 上已經列出了 13 個。
[...], Mozilla’s program requirements say that a change of CA ownership must be disclosed. In this case, that was not done - and in fact, the change was directly denied a few months after it happened.
More recently, even after the evidence of total control was public, WoSign referred to their interest in StartCom in a press release as “an equity investment”, and maintain that the two businesses continue to be separate even today. They say “the original system ... of StartCom remains unchanged”.
However, there is technical evidence that around a month and a half after the acquisition, StartCom issuances switched to using WoSign’s infrastructure - either the same instance of it, or their own instance.
而 Mozilla 要求 WoSign 提供他們產生 serial number 的程式碼時：(在 WoSign 簽出重複的 serial number 問題時得到的)
Mozilla asked WoSign how they generated their serial numbers, and was told that they used the Java package java.crypto.SecureRandom. They supplied the following code snippet:
[...]
However, as can be seen from this simple test harness, this code snippet does not produce serial numbers matching WoSign’s idiosyncratic pattern.
We believe that, taken together, all this shows that StartCom’s certificates are now being issued using either WoSign’s existing infrastructure or a clone of it, and that WoSign’s operational control of StartCom began straight after the November 1st 2015 sale date. This evidence should be compared against WoSign’s recent assertion that “Even now, it still independent in the system, in the validation team and management team, we share the CRL/OCSP distribution resource only.”
This became clear in February of 2016, where a payment processor called WorldPay applied to the CAB Forum for an exception so they could acquire 8 SHA-1 certificates to keep SSL working for their legacy payment terminals. Their CA was unable to help them because of the ban in the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements, and to issue in violation of the ban would lead to a “qualified” (not clean) audit, which might lead to browsers no longer accepting their audit as valid to keep them trusted.
而在亞利桑那的 face-to-face meeting 中剛好就討論了這點，允許 Symantec 簽發，而要提出來的是，WoSign 的 Richard Wang 也在場：
This issue was discussed at length in the CAB Forum face-to-face meeting from 16th-18th February 2016 in Scottsdale, Arizona (where Richard Wang of WoSign was present). Mozilla then had a public discussion about it in our policy forum starting on 23rd of February. In the end, the browsers reluctantly agreed to let Symantec issue these certificates for Worldpay - or rather, they agreed to accept that Symantec’s next audit would be qualified in this way.
所以 Mozilla 再次強調，當下大家的結論是特別許可，簽發被禁止的 SHA-1 certificate 是很嚴重違反規定的事情：
Even at this point, in February 2016, it was (or should have been) clear to all CAs, including WoSign, that issuing SHA-1 certificates in violation of the ban was a Very Big Deal, and that permission had to be sought from the browsers in order for the CA not to face difficulty.
GeoTrust issues a SHA-1 certificate for *.tyro.com from their Equifax root, valid until May 6th 2013.
Apr 6th 2013
A month before their old cert expires, GeoTrust issues a replacement SHA-1 certificate for *.tyro.com from a GeoTrust root, valid until June 7th 2016. A simple roll-over replacement.
Jan 1st 2016
SHA-1 issuance ban comes into effect.
May 24th 2016
A month before their old cert expires, GeoTrust issues a SHA-256 certificate for *.tyro.com from a GeoTrust root, valid until June 23rd 2019.
But the strong evidence is that this SHA-256 certificate did not meet Tyro’s needs. We can see a SHA-1 certificate for *.tyro.com which was logged in CT on June 8th 2016, a day after their previous SHA-1 certificate expired. This certificate is not issued by GeoTrust (who still provide the cert for their main website) or Comodo, tyro.com’s usual providers, but by StartCom. And the notBefore date is that magic date of 20th December, 2015 - a date on which, as noted above, StartSSL.com was closed for upgrading, and on which we have seen many Macau certificates issued by WoSign, which we believe are back-dated.
StartCom are using WoSign’s infrastructure (the same or a clone);
Certificates on this infrastructure with a notBefore of 2015-12-20 (China time) are indeed back-dated - this further confirms our suspicions about the Macau certificates we saw issued by WoSign; and
StartCom’s hierarchy has been directed by management to mis-issue “WoSign-style”.
This last point is important; the practices at WoSign are now being seen at StartCom. Therefore, we conclude that all of ownership, infrastructure and control are sufficiently common between the two companies that it would therefore be reasonable for any action Mozilla chooses to take against WoSign to also be taken against StartCom and vice versa.
1. They don’t appear to be licensed in China (BRs requires that a CA be licensed in the country they do business if a licensing scheme is in place) and
第二個則是同時具有 CA 以及 ccTLD 註冊者的身份：
2. they appear to be a registrar for a TLD as well as a CA.
再來是第二天開頭就看到在討論 EV Wildcard 的問題 (目前是不被允許的)，以及 Domain Validation 的問題。結尾則可以看到中華電信將會主辦 2017 的部份？不是很確定...
由於 US-CERT 的關切，看起來「認證」這件事情 CA/Browser Forum 暫時不會有改善了：
The consensus was that US-CERT was incorrect in saying the email method of domain confirmation presents a vulnerability, that no changes were required, and that the Forum did not need to make any formal response to the US-CERT advisory.
另外是 CNNIC 的事情，也表達「甘我屁事」：
CNNIC sub-CA issue: The members discussed the recent CNNIC sub-CA issue, and noted that Google had recently published its response. Gerv stated that Mozilla was about to publish its response, which would be similar to the Google response. There was consensus that the Forum did not need to take any action.
[...], we have decided to update our code so that Mozilla products will no longer trust any certificate issued by CNNIC’s roots with a notBefore date on or after 1st April 2015.
Update - April 1: As a result of a joint investigation of the events surrounding this incident by Google and CNNIC, we have decided that the CNNIC Root and EV CAs will no longer be recognized in Google products. This will take effect in a future Chrome update. To assist customers affected by this decision, for a limited time we will allow CNNIC’s existing certificates to continue to be marked as trusted in Chrome, through the use of a publicly disclosed whitelist. While neither we nor CNNIC believe any further unauthorized digital certificates have been issued, nor do we believe the misissued certificates were used outside the limited scope of MCS Holdings’ test network, CNNIC will be working to prevent any future incidents. CNNIC will implement Certificate Transparency for all of their certificates prior to any request for reinclusion. We applaud CNNIC on their proactive steps, and welcome them to reapply once suitable technical and procedural controls are in place.
Google 的作法是將現有使用 CNNIC 發出的 SSL certificate 會以白名單形式放入，然後移除現有的 CNNIC 憑證。
