My iPhone 6S has been very slow these past few weeks, and even after updating multiple times, it was still slow. Couldn’t figure out why, but just thought that iOS 11 was still awful to me. Then I used my brother’s iPhone 6 Plus and his was... faster than mine? This is when I knew something was wrong. So, I did some research, and decided to replace my battery.
Regulators in South Korea summoned Google (GOOGL, Tech30) representatives this week to question them about a report that claimed the company was collecting data from Android devices even when location services were disabled.
U.K. data protection officials are also looking into the matter.
Why do we need a custom build of LineageOS to have microG? Can't I install microG on the official LineageOS?
MicroG requires a patch called "signature spoofing", which allows the microG's apps to spoof themselves as Google Apps. LineageOS' developers refused (multiple times) to include the patch, forcing us to fork their project.
Wait, on their FAQ page I see that they don't want to include the patch for security reasons. Is this ROM unsafe?
No. LineageOS' developers hide behind the "security reasons" shield, but in reality they don't care enough about the freedom of their users to risk to upset Google by giving them an alternative to the Play Services. The signature spoofing could be an unsafe feature only if the user blindly gives any permission to any app, as this permission can't be obtained automatically by the apps.
Moreover, to further strengthen the security of our ROM, we modified the signature spoofing permission so that only system privileged apps can obtain it, and no security threat is posed to our users.
Guess what else was released in May 2015? RFC 7540, otherwise known as HTTP/2. In retrospect this seems highly poetic, as HTTP/2 kinda makes the compound document aspect of JSON-API a little bit pointless, and compound documents to me go hand in hand with what JSON-API is as a standard.
These services are using your mobile phone’s IP address to look up your phone number, your billing information and possibly your phone’s current location as provided by cell phone towers (no GPS or phone location services required).
But what these services show us is even more alarming: US telcos appear to be selling direct, non-anonymized, real-time access to consumer telephone data to third party services — not just federal law enforcement officials — who are then selling access to that data.
I found what looks like a third-party API implementation for a Korean Danal API on GitHub. The author wrote the code for South Korean telcos, so there may be differences with US carriers. The query parameters in the HTTP requests are similar to what I remember seeing in the Danal demo. It’s unclear from my reading of the code whether or not this API requires operation inside of e.g. a Danal Inc. hosted-iframe for identity confirmation. The diagram on page 4 of this documentation describing the Korean “Danal Pay” service appears to show the client interacting with the customer’s servers only.
Now, with direct device access, mobile applications developers can use individual devices in their private test set as if they were directly connected to their local machine via USB. Developers can now test against a wide array of devices just like they would as if the devices were sitting on their desk.