Imgur 宣佈 HTTPS 化:「HTTPS on Imgur」。
Today, we deployed HTTPS by default on Imgur. All traffic is now redirected to https:// and, as of now, HTTPS is the default on all Imgur URLs.
總算是上線了... 先前是靠 HTTPS Everywhere 做。
幹壞事是進步最大的原動力
Imgur 宣佈 HTTPS 化:「HTTPS on Imgur」。
Today, we deployed HTTPS by default on Imgur. All traffic is now redirected to https:// and, as of now, HTTPS is the default on all Imgur URLs.
總算是上線了... 先前是靠 HTTPS Everywhere 做。
先前美國政府透過搜索票,要求各雲端廠商提供海外伺服器的資料而引起話題 (像是先前 Microsoft 往上打官司抵抗:「Does US have right to data on overseas servers? We’re about to find out」),而現在看起來 Google 打算放棄掙扎了:「Google stops challenging most US warrants for data on overseas servers」。
Google has quietly stopped challenging most search warrants from US judges in which the data requested is stored on overseas servers, according to the Justice Department.
Microsoft 這邊有些不錯的進展,成功在巡迴庭擋下:
Microsoft convinced the New York-based 2nd US Circuit Court of Appeals—which has jurisdiction over Connecticut, New York, and Vermont—that US search-and-seizure law does not require compliance with a warrant to turn over e-mail stored on its servers in Ireland.
不過沒看到 AWS 相關的消息,感覺不妙...
在「Homebrew Analytics Install On Request Events — Homebrew」這邊,Homebrew 利用了傳回來的資訊算出 2016/07/14 到 2017/07/14 的安裝套件次數,列出前一千名。(我是把他關掉,因為隱私問題不想要傳出去... 參考「Homebrew 會將安裝資訊送到 Google Analytics 上」這篇。)
比較有趣的是第一名的 node 超級多,比第二名加第三名的 git + wget 還多...
拿來翻一翻還 ok,順便看一下大家用什麼...
文章的作者試了很多家 VPN 服務,然後文章的標題有點長,有種輕小說的感覺...:「I tested the most recommended VPN providers using my credit card to find the best ones — and which ones you should avoid.」。
不過這種文章有很多東西很主觀,大家心裡有個底就是了...
作者比較滿意的是 TunnelBear 與 OVPN 這兩家,也許等手上 PIA 到期的時候再試看看要怎麼選好了,畢竟 PIA 還是目前最便宜的方案。
Troy Hunt 放出三億筆 SHA1 hash 過的密碼讓大家研究:「Introducing 306 Million Freely Downloadable Pwned Passwords」。
他引用了 NIST 新的草案中對密碼的建議,阻擋已知外洩的密碼:
檔案可以在「I been pwned? Pwned Passwords」這邊下載。
Telegram 說明他們將會使用 CDN 加速:「More Speed and Security!」。
資料在 CDN 的節點上是加密的,金鑰需要透過 Telegram 的 key server 提供:
While these caching nodes are only used to temporarily store public media (imagine Telegram versions of superpopular YouTube hits), all data that goes through them is encrypted with a key unknown to the caching nodes. In other words, we treat these CDN caching nodes just like we treat your internet provider – they only ever get encrypted junk they can't decipher.
但這表示 Telegram 本身有能力解開這些資料?不知道這邊講的是什麼行為...
使用者如果選擇願意公開的話當然沒問題,但這種情況下也不需要 CDN 加密;而當使用者不願意公開時,應該是期望 Telegram 也無法解開這些資料?再來看看到底是怎麼樣的功能要上 CDN?
前陣子看到的「Membership Inference Attacks against Machine Learning Models」,裡面試著做到的攻擊手法:
[G]iven a data record and black-box access to a model, determine if the record was in the model's training dataset.
也就是拿到一組 Open Data 的存取權限,然後發展一套方法判斷某筆資料是否在裡面。而驗證攻擊的手法當然就是直接攻擊看效果:
We empirically evaluate our inference techniques on classification models trained by commercial "machine learning as a service" providers such as Google and Amazon. Using realistic datasets and classification tasks, including a hospital discharge dataset whose membership is sensitive from the privacy perspective, we show that these models can be vulnerable to membership inference attacks. We then investigate the factors that influence this leakage and evaluate mitigation strategies.
透過 NN 攻擊 NN,而目前的解法也不太好處理,但有做總是會讓精確度降低。論文裡提到了四種讓難度增加的方法:
另外一個值得看的資料是 2006 年發生的「AOL search data leak」,當年資料被放出來後有真實的使用者被找出來,也是很轟動啊...
看到由 Google 主導的 BoringSSL 有計劃將其中一塊申請 FIPS 140-2 的驗證計畫 (BoringCrypto 的部份):「FIPS 140-2」。
其中 FIPS 140-2 最有名的後門應該是 Dual_EC_DRBG (定義於 NIST SP 800-90A,被 FIPS 140-2 引用),所以特地講清楚他們選擇哪個演算法:
FIPS 140-2 requires that one of its PRNGs be used (which they call DRBGs). In BoringCrypto, we use CTR-DRBG with AES-256 exclusively and RAND_bytes (the primary interface for the rest of the system to get random data) takes its output from there.
而且還花了不少篇幅解釋 PRNG 的細節。
在 Bruce Schneier 的 blog 上看到 KeyMe 這個服務:「Now It's Easier than Ever to Steal Someone's Keys」。
你把鑰匙的照片拍下來,透過 app 上傳付款後,他就把鑰匙寄給你 XDDD
查了一下資料,在五年前 (2012) 的時候就有人做遠距離攻擊的研究了:「60 公尺外,拍照攝影就可以重製鑰匙...」,所以有好的方面,也有邪惡的方面...
Let's Encrypt 把時間表喊出來了,預定在 2018 年年初開放使用:「Wildcard Certificates Coming January 2018」。
Wildcard SSL Certificate 會需要走新的 ACME v2 協定認證:
Wildcard certificates will be offered free of charge via our upcoming ACME v2 API endpoint. We will initially only support base domain validation via DNS for wildcard certificates, but may explore additional validation options over time.
跟前陣子提到的「ACME v2 API Endpoint Coming January 2018」是相同的時間。
這好讚...