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純 CSS 的追蹤技巧

Hacker News 上看到的 PoC,程式碼就放在 GitHubjbtronics/CrookedStyleSheets 上。能追蹤的細節當然比較少,不過透過 CSS 還是有不少資訊可以蒐集。

像是連結被觸發時:

#link2:active::after {
    content: url("track.php?action=link2_clicked");
}

瀏覽器的資訊:

@supports (-webkit-appearance:none) {
    #chrome_detect::after {
        content: url("track.php?action=browser_chrome");
    }
}

字型的 fingerprint:

/** Font detection **/@font-face {
    font-family: Font1;
    src: url("track.php?action=font1");
}

#font_detection1 {
    font-family: Calibri, Font1;
}

捲頁行為:

@keyframes pulsate {
    0% {background-image: url("track.php?duration=00")}
    20% {background-image: url("track.php?duration=20")}
    40% {background-image: url("track.php?duration=40")}
    60% {background-image: url("track.php?duration=60")}
    80% {background-image: url("track.php?duration=80")}
    100% {background-image: url("track.php?duration=100")}
}

算是提供了不少除了 <noscript></noscript> 外的手段,不過一般網站要引入這些技巧需要改不少東西就是了... (或是需要透過 server side plugin 的修改進行追蹤)

Tor 0.3.2.9 釋出,支援下一代的 Hidden Service

Tor 放出了新的 stable 版本:「Tor 0.3.2.9 is released: We have a new stable series!」。

這個版本支援新一代的 hidden service,也就是之前在「下一代的 Tor Hidden Service」這邊提到的東西,將原來 hostname 的部份從 16 chars 變成 56 chars,也就是像 7fa6xlti5joarlmkuhjaifa47ukgcwz6tfndgax45ocyn4rixm632jid.onion 這樣的網址。

這對 hidden service 很重要,因為這代表了淘汰掉舊的演算法,尤其裡面有兩個 (SHA1 與 RSA1024) 都已經確定有問題了:

a) Better crypto (replaced SHA1/DH/RSA1024 with SHA3/ed25519/curve25519)

ExpressVPN 在土耳其的 VPN server 被抄...

ExpressVPN 在土耳其的 VPN server 被抄,為了調查大使的刺殺案件:「VPN Server Seized to Investigate Russian Ambassador’s Assassination」。

A VPN server operated by ExpressVPN was seized by Turkish authorities to investigate the assassination of Andrei Karlov, the Russian Ambassador to Turkey. Authorities hoped to find more information on people who removed digital traces of the assassin, but the server in question held no logs.

ExpressVPN 官方的回覆在「ExpressVPN statement on Andrey Karlov investigation」,主要的部份是:

As we stated to Turkish authorities in January 2017, ExpressVPN does not and has never possessed any customer connection logs that would enable us to know which customer was using the specific IPs cited by the investigators. Furthermore, we were unable to see which customers accessed Gmail or Facebook during the time in question, as we do not keep activity logs. We believe that the investigators’ seizure and inspection of the VPN server in question confirmed these points.

至於是不是真的,就需要時間確認了...

在 Ubuntu 16.04 上面隨機改變無線網卡的 MAC address

在「Randomize your WiFi MAC address on Ubuntu 16.04」這邊看到作者在介紹如何在 Ubuntu 上藉由改變無線網卡的 MAC address 保護自己的隱私:

Your device’s MAC address can be used to track you across the WiFi networks you connect to. That data can be shared and sold, and often identifies you as an individual. It’s possible to limit this tracking by using pseudo-random MAC addresses.

成果像是這樣:

主要應該是給 Ubuntu 的筆電使用者用...

LinkedIn 忘記續約導致 SSL Certificate 過期

Netcraft 上看到 LinkedIn 出包的消息,這次是 country-mixed 的版本出包:「LinkedIn certificate blunder leaves users LockedOut!」。

在 DNS 上也可以看出來這兩個 CNAME 到不一樣的 load balancer 上:

;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.linkedin.com.       260     IN      CNAME   2-01-2c3e-003c.cdx.cedexis.net.
2-01-2c3e-003c.cdx.cedexis.net. 93 IN   CNAME   pop-ehk1.www.linkedin.com.
pop-ehk1.www.linkedin.com. 3560 IN      A       144.2.3.1
;; ANSWER SECTION:
de.linkedin.com.        86400   IN      CNAME   cctld.linkedin.com.
cctld.linkedin.com.     86400   IN      CNAME   mix.linkedin.com.
mix.linkedin.com.       213     IN      CNAME   pop-ehk1.mix.linkedin.com.
pop-ehk1.mix.linkedin.com. 3546 IN      A       144.2.3.5

SSL Labs 上也看得出來在 Alternative names 的地方是不一樣的:「SSL Server Test: www.linkedin.com (Powered by Qualys SSL Labs)」、「SSL Server Test: de.linkedin.com (Powered by Qualys SSL Labs)」。

然後因為 LinkedIn 有設定 HSTS,所以使用者在界面上完全無法登入:

Google Chrome 上可以用 badidea 繞過 (參考「在 Google Chrome 連上因 HSTS 而無法連線的網站」),但在 Mozilla Firefox 上的話目前沒找到方法可以在界面上 bypass,而是需要改 SiteSecurityServiceState.txt 這個檔案:「HTTP Strict Transport Security prevents me from accessing a server that I'm doing development on」。

不過也因為兩個 cluster 獨立運作,網址改一下應該就會動了...

這幾年比較很少看到大公司出這種包,還蠻有趣的 XD

這次換 HP 裝 Spyware 啦~

討論的頗熱烈的,像是「HP is installing spyware on its machines disguised as an "analytics client"」、「HP stealthily installs new spyware called HP Touchpoint Analytics Client」。

這個軟體會被注意到是因為吃太多資源,而且使用者沒有同意安裝這個軟體 (目前看是起來是透過自動更新機制裝進去的):「Didn't Install HP TouchpointAnalyticsClient and It's Causing CPU 95-98 Red」(先備份一份在這邊,以免被砍...)。

然後這軟體很明顯會傳資料回 HP:

The HP Touchpoint Manager technology is now being delivered as a part of HP Device as a Service (DaaS) Analytics and Proactive Management capabilities. Therefore, HP is discontinuing the self-managed HP Touchpoint Manager solution.

先前聯想因為類似的行為賠了 350 萬美金,這次 HP 搞這包不知道會怎麼樣...

南韓出手調查 Google 未經同意蒐集位置資訊的問題了

在「就算關掉 Google 的定位服務也還是會蒐集位置資訊...」這邊提到的蒐集問題,南韓出手調查了:「Regulators question Google over location data」。

Regulators in South Korea summoned Google (GOOGL, Tech30) representatives this week to question them about a report that claimed the company was collecting data from Android devices even when location services were disabled.

英國也在看情況:

U.K. data protection officials are also looking into the matter.

美國與歐盟其他國家反而還沒看到消息... (不過美國有可能是以訴訟的方式進行)

AWS Certificate Manager 支援 DNS 認證的方式頒發憑證了

AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) 可以用 DNS 的方式認證了:「Easier Certificate Validation Using DNS with AWS Certificate Manager」。

不過這不同於 Let's Encrypt 在推的 dns-01,而是 AWS 自己定義的方式:

然後文章後面又再次提醒了一次,如果要用在 Amazon CloudFront,必須使用 us-east-1 的 ACM:

Note that your certificate must be in the US East (N. Virginia) Region to use the certificate with CloudFront.

這個方式讓自動化更容易做... 以前需要收信確認,雖然也是可以寫程式硬幹,但就得冒著 AWS 改版造成程式失效的風險。

就算關掉 Google 的定位服務也還是會蒐集位置資訊...

就如標題所寫的,Quartz 獨家刊出來的新聞,即使你關掉 Google 的定位服務,Google 還是會蒐集你的位置 (而且跟 Google 發言人確認後也證實):「Google collects Android users’ locations even when location services are disabled」。

而且是全背景作業,在你沒有開定位服務,沒有插 SIM 卡,也沒有跑任何 app,他就會將定位資訊傳出去:

Many people realize that smartphones track their locations. But what if you actively turn off location services, haven’t used any apps, and haven’t even inserted a carrier SIM card?

從今年年初開始這樣搞的,Google 發言人只宣稱這個資料並沒有被用來整合到「network sync system」,並且會立即丟掉 (所以你還是不知道被用到什麼地方):

“In January of this year, we began looking into using Cell ID codes as an additional signal to further improve the speed and performance of message delivery,” the Google spokesperson said in an email. “However, we never incorporated Cell ID into our network sync system, so that data was immediately discarded, and we updated it to no longer request Cell ID.”

這句話的意思其實代表著是丟掉 raw data,改以統計的方式轉移存到其他系統。

另外 John Gruber 在「Google Collects Android Users' Locations Even When Location Services Are Disabled」其實寫的更直接:

If they were “never used or stored”, why did they start collecting them in the first place? This is like a kid caught with their hand in the cookie jar saying they weren’t going to eat any cookies. Sure.

白話一點就是「你當我傻逼啊」。

應該會促進 microG 的發展... (參考「microG 的進展...」)

解鎖 iPhone 的 Diper ID...

Twitter 上看到 Diper ID 這個糟糕的東西:

查了資料,操作方式可以從這個影片看到:

這明顯有資安問題啊 XDDD

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