在「Security fixes for Libgcrypt and GnuPG 1.4 [CVE-2016-6316]」這邊看到這個歷史悠久的 bug：
Felix Dörre and Vladimir Klebanov from the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology found a bug in the mixing functions of Libgcrypt's random number generator: An attacker who obtains 4640 bits from the RNG can trivially predict the next 160 bits of output. This bug exists since 1998 in all GnuPG and Libgcrypt versions.
就這樣的行為，對於自己用的機器應該是還好... 不過得到 4640 bits 後就可以預測接下來的 160 bits，這個 RNG 有點囧 @_@
官方目前是認為應該還好：
A first analysis on the impact of this bug in GnuPG shows that existing RSA keys are not weakened. For DSA and Elgamal keys it is also unlikely that the private key can be predicted from other public information. This needs more research and I would suggest _not to_ overhasty revoke keys.
不過如果你有絕對的安全需求的話還是可以考慮 revoke 再重新生一把...